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CIVIC VIRTUE AND THE FEMININE VOICE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
Suzanna Sherry*
A woman's writing is always feminine; it cannot help being feminine; at its best it is most feminine; the only difficulty lies in defming what we mean by feminine.1

W

HAT is true of women's writing is also true of women's jurisprudence. This article contends that modern men and
women, in general, have distinctly different perspectives on the
world and that, while the masculine vision parallels pluralist liberal theory, the feminine vision is more closely aligned with classical republican theory, represented in its various forms by Aristotle,
Machiavelli, and Jefferson. A feminine jurisprudence, evident, for
example, in the decisions of Justice O'Connor, might thus be quite
unlike any other contemporary jurisprudence. Emergence of a feminine jurisprudence might therefore influence whether academic
calls for new (or rather recycled) jurisprudential theories based
upon our classical republican tradition will ultimately have little
impact or will usher in a paradigm shift in moral, political, and
constitutional theory.
American political and jurisprudential theory has long repudiated its classical republican origins in favor of a highly pluralist
liberal vision. Contemporary constitutional interpretation is thus
grounded on a thoroughly individualist liberal philosophy. Modern
historians, however, have recently refocused attention on the less
individualist republican spirit animating the Revolution. This has
led a number of constitutional scholars to advocate a return to the
nation's early republican values in interpretation of the Constitution. In light of the liberal underpinnings of the last 200 years of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1976, Middlebury College;
J.D. 1979, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Laura J. Cooper, Richard T. Eldridge, Daniel A. Farber, Geoffrey R. Stone, Gerald Torres, and G. Edward White for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and Theodore J. May for his invaluable
research assistance.
Virginia Woolf.
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American jurisprudence and the depth of the original transformation from a republican to a liberal ideology, these scholars might
be engaged in a futile exercise. This article suggests, however, that
modern liberalism is a characteristically masculine response to the
failure of Jeffersonian republicanism. Because the masculine perspective has been the dominant-and virtually the sole-influence
on the legal and political structure, that structure is bound to reflect a more masculine or liberal emphasis on individualism over
community. A feminine jurisprudence, instead of rejecting the
communitarian and virtue-based framework of Jeffersonian republicanism, might embrace and adapt it for modern society.
A full description of a feminine jurisprudence requires an examination of the modern liberal jurisprudence to which the feminine
paradigm offers such a contrast. The article will first describe and
differentiate the classical tradition from its modern counterpart,
and briefly set out the transition from the former to the latter in
the American context. It will then identify the characteristically
modern framework of the three dominant contemporary schools of
jurisprudence: conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism. Finally,
the article will draw on ,feminist work in psychological and literary
theory to sketch out the basic feminine alternative to the modern
paradigm, and examine Justice O'Connor's opinions both to suggest the operation of a feminine paradigm and to sketch its possible contours in a jurisprudential or constitutional context.
I. Two PARADIGMS
Let us imagine two contrasting (and somewhat idealized) paradigms of political and moral philosophy.2 The "modern" paradigm
is individualist. The underlying theme of this atomistic vision is
autonomy and separation. Individuals are seen as distinct units:

As I am using the term, a paradigm is that underlying belief structure common to all
practitioners in a given discipline. See T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1011 (1962). A paradigm limits what can be perceived as a problem or solution and blinds
those who work within it to alternative paradigms. Id. See S. Fish, Is There A Text In This
Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities 270-74 (1980); Tushnet, Truth, Justice,
and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57
Tex. L. Rev. 1307, 1346 (1979). Recent studies on expert decisionmaking processes suggest,
moreover, that paradigms become so internalized that they are unrecognized even by astute
experts trying to describe their own thought processes. See, e.g., Johnson, What Kind of
Expert Should A System Be?, 8 J. Med. & Philos. 77 (1983).
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the individualist paradigm denies the possibility of intersubjective
conceptions of self.3 Thus, relationships among individuals, including the communities they form, are secondary. As Michael Sandel
describes it: "[W]hat separates us is in some important sense prior
to what connects us-epistemologically prior as well as morally
prior. We are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with others; hence
4
the priority of plurality over unity."
The modern response to this basic human separateness can, in
the context of epistemological and moral theory, take either of two
forms. The more common is adoption of an essentially pluralistic
and non-teleological view of human nature. This view holds that
there is no unitary end toward which humans aspire, no transcendent concept of the good life. "[T]he variety and heterogeneity of
human goods is such that their pursuit cannot be reconciled in any
single moral order . . . 5
If there is no human telos and no unitary moral order, the mechanism for mediating among competing individual interests must
necessarily be abstract and universalizable, for it must be applicable to myriad individuals in unforeseeable circumstances. It cannot
be contextual, for a contextual resolution of different interests presupposes an identifiable hierarchy of human values (e.g., one's
rights "as a person" are more important than one's rights "as a
woman").' Belief in such a hierarchy-or at least the utilization of
I Sandel defines intersubjective conceptions of self as those which "allow that in certain
moral circumstances, the relevant description of self may embrace more than a single, individuated human being." M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 62 (1982). The
depth of the modern paradigm's rejection of this concept is illustrated by Charles Fried's
comment that it is too "obscure" even to comprehend. Fried, Book Review, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
960, 966-67 (1983) (reviewing M. Sandel, supra).
4 M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 133; accord D. Richards, The Moral Criticism of Law 51
(1977).
5 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 133 (1981) (describing, but not
advocating, modem liberal theory).
' For example, if all persons have a right to equal treatment, it might mean that women
are entitled to no special dispensations as a result of their capacity to become pregnant:
pregnancy may be excluded from an employer's medical or disability plans because both
men and women then have the same medical coverage. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974). On the
other hand, if gender (a more specific quality than personhood) is relevant, women may be
entitled to greater medical coverage because of their capacity to become pregnant. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982); Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 39 (1985). Liberalism
has a hard time resolving disputes at this level.
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such a hierarchy to resolve differences within a society 7-is incompatible with the pluralistic basis of the modern tradition. Moreover, a concern with context is also incompatible with the atomistic perspective of modernism: "[I]f individuals are distinct and not
essentially connected with one another, then morality can be expected to concern itself not with the particularity of relationships
among people, but with abstractly characterizable features of interactions among individuals whose natures are taken as given."8
The modern paradigm must therefore encompass a system of abstract rules that recognizes both the priority of the individual and
the likelihood that diversity will engender dispute. The modern
political tradition has supplied just such a system. The concept of
individual rights contains all the features required by an individualist political philosophy. Rights are abstract and universal, and
are expected to resolve disputes without attending to the concrete
attributes of the particular individuals involved. A rights-based
theory does not require a unitary human telos, but instead allows
each individual to develop and progress toward realization of his
own values. Rights are the perfect mediating mechanism for a collection of individuals whose aims are essentially in conflict.
The alternative modern response to the separateness of individuals is to seek an abstract mediating principle at the level of
describing human nature itself: to identify and justify abstract,
transcendent human values. These values are epistemologically rational in that they are derived by intellectual means alone, and
they are characteristically modern insofar as they are intentionally
.divorced from the contexts in which humans live. This transcendental method of avoiding contextual decisionmaking can derive
its description of human nature from an abstract idealization of a

See, e.g., B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 10-12 (1980); A. MacIntyre,
supra note 5, at 11, 235-37; M. Sandel, supra note 3; Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and
Private Morality 113, 142 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
8 Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of Psychology, in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
225, 237 (S. Harding & M. Hintikka eds. 1983).
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universal human telos,9 from a contractarianism rationally deduced from humanity in the state of nature, 10 or from thin air.'1
The modern paradigm thus reflects an infrastructure of independent, autonomous individuals, tied together by nothing more than
the necessity of society. The particular characteristics of those individuals are irrelevant; 2 and thus the modern tradition has had
to develop a transcendental approach to conflicts between individuals, focusing on the abstract rights of each rather than on the relationship between them.
The "classical" paradigm stands in radical contrast to the modern perspective. The central theme is connection rather than autonomy. The classical paradigm recognizes an intersubjective vision of self, insofar as "selves must be beings that exist in
communities," and self-knowledge is a communal project. 3 Relationships among individuals are more important than the discrete,
abstract individuals themselves. Thomas Jefferson, one of the last
adherents of the classical paradigm,' 4 described perfectly the contrast between the modern focus on individuals and the classical
emphasis on relations among individuals:

' Modern philosophers fitting this description are rare: Alasdair Maclntyre is the best
example. See A. Maclntyre, supra note 5. Maclntyre and Aristotle, from whom the former
derives much of his philosophy, are in a peculiar position vis-a-vis the modern/classical dichotomy. Insofar as identifying a human telos represents a virtue-based, non-individualist
philosophy, they illustrate the classical paradigm. However, as the text suggests, their adoption of transcendenthuman teloi translates easily into the modern paradigm of abstraction.
Thus Aristotle, the father of the classical perspective, provides the seeds of both the modem
masculine paradigm (insofar as it is abstract) and the feminine paradigm (insofar as it is
teleological). The masculine paradigm abandons Aristotle's teleology, and the feminine paradigm abandons his transcendence.
"0 John Rawls may be thought to fit in this category (although his rights theories are also
compatible with the more Dworkinian method of avoiding contextuality). See Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale L.J. 1567, 1600-01 (1985) (associating
Rawls with Rousseau).
11 See, e.g., R. Unger, Passion (1984).
'z The modern paradigm views individuals as fungible "ciphers." See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 623 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"' See R. Eldridge, The Situation of the Self: Waywardness, Self-Knowledge, Value, and
Community in Wordsworth's Poetry (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with Virginia
Law Review Association).
4 See infra notes 21-54 and accompanying text. Jefferson's library contained an extensive
collection of works by both Aristotle and Machiavelli, the two seminal thinkers of the classical tradition as I am describing it. See E. Sowerby, Catalogue of the Library of Thomas
Jefferson (1983).
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Self-interest, or rather self-love, or egoism, has been more plausibly substituted as the basis of morality. But I consider our relations with others as constituting the boundaries of morality. With
ourselves we stand on the ground of identity, not of relation, which
last, requiring two subjects, excludes self-love confined to a single
one. To ourselves, in strict language, we can owe no duties, obligation requiring also two parties. Self-love, therefore, is no part of
morality. 15
The classical tradition "entails the affirmation that homo is naturally a citizen and most fully himself when living in a vivere
16
civile.'
Moreover, because humans are perceived fundamentally as
members of a unitary community, it is possible to construct a
shared telos. The community chooses and shapes its own aspirations from among competing visions of the good life, not by a
mechanism of mediation, nor by abstract philosophizing, but by a
conscious selection and ordering of values. The enduring values
thus chosen are the product neither of mere interest calculus nor
of rational thought divorced from reality, but rather an artistic or
creative weaving of rational thought, intuition, and tradition. The
classical paradigm is thus teleological, both in the generic sense of
being goal-based and in the more specialized Aristotelian sense of
envisioning a human end. This is not to suggest an Aristotelian
telos that transcends history and society. It is instead to suggest an
immanent telos: one defined in the context of the historically
bound community that aspires to it. 17 The telos provides a context
in which disputes can be resolved in individual cases, and there is
less need to resort to a doctrine of abstract rights.
The modern and classical traditions thus exhibit three characteristic differences. First, modernism is atomistic where classicalism is holistic. In the modern paradigm, society is a collection of
individuals; in the classical view, individuals are bits of society.
15Letter to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814, in The Complete Jefferson 1032 (S. Padover ed.
1943).
16 Pocock, Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought, 9
Pol. Theory, Aug., 1981, at 353, 355.
17 See supra note 9. For an elaboration of this difference between transcendent and immanent teloi, see R. Eldridge, supra note 13; cf. Kronman, supra note 10 (advocating, following Bickel, a contextual, experiential, or immanent moral/political system in contrast to
a modern notion of a universal and abstract rationally-derived system).
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Second, modernism is either pluralistic and thus necessarily nonteleological or transcendently teleological, while classicalism is
unitarily but contextually (immanently) teleological. To describe
fully a classical moral or political philosophy one must identify an
immanent human telos; to describe a modern philosophy is to deny
that such a telos exists. Third, modernism is abstract and therefore
rule-based where classicalism is contextual. A theory of rights is
only necessary-indeed only coherent-in the modern paradigm.,'
A form of the classical paradigm dominated the political and
moral theories of the Greek philosophers, culminating in the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotelian and Christian theories, both envisioning organic communities of virtue, 9 constituted the reigning
paradigm for nearly two thousand years. The classical focus on
human virtue and human community, however, failed to sustain a
changing world, and self-interest captured the human imagination.
The Enlightenment marked a paradigm shift, the beginnings of
what became the modern individualist tradition. 2° Although the
classical paradigm underlay one final post-Enlightenment experiment, the American Revolution, that flirtation with classical republican political thought also died, and Locke's Enlightenment
liberalism-the political theory of the modern paradigm-ultimately formed the ideological basis of the American republic. The transformation of American ideology from classical republicanism to modern liberalism illustrates the failure of the
classical tradition. That failure rests on a fundamentally pessimistic perception of human nature and a sadly alienated perception of
self. From man as a virtuous (or at least perfectable) zoon poli-

"sMacIntyre

describes the differences between the classical and modern traditions in
similar fashion. See A. MacIntyre, supra note 5, at 146-47, 223-34; see also Oakeshott, The
Rule of Law, in On History and Other Essays 125 (1983) (describing similar differences
between "teleocratic" and "rule of law" societies).
19A number of scholars have compared Christianity, especially early Christianity, to the
modern liberal tradition, identifying the former as closer to what I am describing as the
classical paradigm. See J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought 56-79 (1981); N. Noddings, Caring- A Feminine Approach to Ethics and
Moral Education (1984) (relying heavily on Martin Buber); see also Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12-14 (1983) (identifying Judeo-Christian norms as
"paideic" or communitarian). There are, of course, major differences between the two theories, and highly divergent variations within each tradition, but all are easily described, in
contrast to the modern paradigm, as virtue-based and anti-individualist.
10 See A. MacIntyre, supra note 5.
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tikon, the modern paradigm moves to man as incorrigibly selfish
and inevitably singular.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM IN AMERICAN
HISTORY: FROM REVOLUTION To RATIFICATION

In the last two decades there has been a "remarkable historiographic upheaval" 2 1 over the ideological origins of the American
Revolution. Once thought to be thoroughly individualist in its outlook, the Revolution has been reinterpreted by contemporary historians "not as a Lockean effort to protect property from taxation
and regulation but as a Machiavellian effort to preserve the young
republic's 'virtue' from the corrupt and corrupting forces of English politics. 2 2 These historians thus find the origins of American
revolutionary ideology in classical republicanism, primarily as envi21 D. Winch, Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision 29 (1978).
22

J. Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Founda-

tions of Liberalism 9-10 (1984). The most influential of these revisionist republican works
include B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967); J. Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975); G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (1969). The
older, Lockean tradition is admirably represented by L. Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in
America (1955). According to this interpretation, the founding fathers wholeheartedly endorsed the paradigm of the Enlightenment, rejecting classical notions of virtue and polis.
Hartz confidently describes "the national acceptance of the Lockean creed, ultimately enshrined in the Constitution." Id. at 9.
There is a backlash against the republican revisionists. Both John Diggins and Isaac
Kramnick dispute Pocock's description of the American Revolution as essentially Machiavellian. Kramnick merely finds the total rejection of any Lockean influence unpalatable.
Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 Am. Hist. Rev. 629 (1982). In his view, the
American experience represented part of the ongoing paradigm shift initiated by the Enlightenment: English and American radicals "knew their Aristotle, their Machiavelli, and
their Montesquieu. But they also knew their Locke." Id. at 664.
Diggins seems to deny that classical republicanism had any influence on thb American
revolutionaries, describing his most recent book as a "corrective to the pretensions of American virtue." J. Diggins, supra, at 15. He admits, however, that the rhetoric of the Revolution was republican and that the question of virtue as a foundation for the state was at least
debated. See, e.g., id at 24, 31. Moreover, most of his counter-republican illustrations center
on the Constitutional era rather than the earlier revolutionary era and thus do not disprove
the thesis that the original American paradigm was republican and became liberal only
later. See, e.g., id. at 68, 77, 85-86, 97-98.
Diggins, unlike most modem historians, puts little faith in political rhetoric as iluminating ideology or reasons for action. See id. at 347-58; cf. Appleby, What is Still American in
the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?, 39 Win. & M. Q., 3d ser., 287, 308 (1982)
(denying that Jeffersonians were classical republicans, but admitting that Pocock and others
"are surely correct to insist that civic humanism shaped the terms of political debate in the
early national period").
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sioned by Machiavelli. Within a short time, however, that ideology
began to undergo a major transformation. Perhaps as early as 1787,
or as late as the aftermath of the Civil War, 23 classical republicanism faded from the American political consciousness, to be replaced by the liberalism of Locke and Madison.
The contrast between the republican Revolution and the liberal
Constitution is stark. Republicanism, unlike liberalism, exalts the
good of the whole over the good of its individual members. Where
liberalism finds the primary purpose of government to be promotion of the diverse goods of its individual citizens, republicanism
finds its primary purpose to be definition of community values and
creation of the public and private virtue necessary for societal
achievement of those values. The framing of the Constitution completed an ideological transformation from "the perhaps naive Jeffersonian faith in the capacity of the individual for self-development and self-restraint [to] the more generally accepted realism
and consecration of self-interest which we associate with Alexander
Hamilton. ' ' 24 The remainder of this section will describe that
25
transformation.

23

See, e.g., G. Wood, supra note 22, at 606 (1787 and the adoption of the Constitution

signaled "the end of classical politics"); L. Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution
of A Party Ideology (1978) (liberalism triumphed no earlier than the end of the War of
1812); R. Ketcham, Presidents Above Party- The First American Presidency, 1789-1829
(1984) (classical politics ended with rise of Jacksonian democracy); D. Howe, The Political
Culture of the American Whigs 301-05 (1979) (republican or Whig values lasted until after
Civil War); Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed,
in New Directions in American Intellectual History 116, 122-29 (J. Higham & P. Conkin
eds. 1979) (republicanism lingered through 1880's); J. Pocock, supra note 22, at 526-45
(classical influence and awareness of the "Machiavellian moment" continues to present
day); cf. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 253 (1977) ("Law,
once conceived of as ... a paramount expression of the moral sense of the community, had
come [by 1850] to be thought of as facilitative of individual desires .... ').
U Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right To Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L.
& Econ. 467, 487 (1976).
" The description of this transformation is of necessity generalized and somewhat simplistic. The framers, whether liberal or republican, were neither as monolithic nor as fundamentally antithetical as this description supposes. For an excellent discussion of the different strands of American republicanism, see Kelley, Ideology and Political Culture From
Jefferson to Nixon, 82 Am. Hist. Rev. 531, 536-39 (1977). What I hope to create, however, is
a heightened sense of three essential disputes: (1) whether society was an organic whole or a
collection of individuals; (2) whether man was irretrievably self-interested or potentially virtuous and community-minded; and (3) whether the function of government was to define
and safeguard the common good or protect individual liberties. I rely primarily on the work
of historians and do not pretend to be making a new contribution in describing these con-
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Three themes dominated the thought of the neoclassical American republicans: the good of the commonwealth as a whole, the
subordination of individual interests through the promotion of
civic virtue, and citizen participation in a deliberative, value-selective form of government. 26 These three themes were derived from
classical republicanism and were the focus of the American revolutionaries and their English predecessors, the "country" party of
Bolingbroke and Burgh. Commonwealth, virtue, and an ordered
system of values are, moreover, integrally and necessarily related
to one another. The good of the commonwealth requires that citizens subordinate their private interests, and the fostering of civic
virtue is the mechanism by which they may be expected to do so.
Neither private virtue nor public good, however, can be defined in
a vacuum: in the republican vision, a primary function of government is to order values and to define virtue, and thereby educate
its citizenry to be virtuous.28
The republicans conceived of society in organic terms, viewing it
flicts or their ultimate resolution. Quotations from Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and the like
are therefore used solely for their illustrative value, not their probative value.
24 See Katz, supra note 24; J. Pocock, supra note 22, at 506-52; G. Wood, supra note 22, at
46-70, 91-124.
Several other aspects of republican thought must be distinguished as not relevant to the
thesis of this article. First, a republican form of government meant (and still means) rule by
the people rather than by a monarchy. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 39, at 250-51 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("we may define a republic to be . . . a government which
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from. . . the people"). This feature of republican
theory, of course, not only survived but became the centerpiece of the liberal Constitution.
Adherence to the republican concept of popular representation thus did not undergo any
significant transformation. Second, even early Revolutionary thinkers had difficulty with
the elitist, anti-egalitarian features of classical republicanism. Thus, the egalitarianism that
creates such a dilemma for modern liberalism, see sources cited at infra note 119, was present from the beginning; again, no serious transformation was necessary. Finally, republicanism has also been associated with a bias against modern commerce and industry. Joyce
Appleby notes that modern historians have "turned the Jeffersonians into nostalgic men
fighting a rearguard action against the forces of modernity." Appleby, Commercial Farming
and the "Agrarian Myth" in the Early Republic, 68 J. Am. Hist. 833, 835 (1982); see Home,
Bourgeois Virtue, Property and Moral Philosophy in America, 1750-1800, 4 Hist. Pol.
Thought 317 (1983). The agrarian, anti-commercial aspect of republicanism is largely irrelevant to this article, except insofar as it suggests that republicanism is handicapped by its
adulation of the past.
27 See L. Banning, supra note 23, at 21-69; J. Pocock, supra note 22, at 406-22, 462-505;
Murrin, The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country- A Comparison of the Revolution
Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816), in Three British Revolutions:
1641, 1688, 1776, at 368 (J. Pocock ed. 1980).
2' See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 36 (1985).
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as an independent entity distinct from its members.29 The common
good was thus distinct from and paramount to the good of individuals. Thomas Paine identified this corporate vision of society with
the definition of republicanism itself: "[T]he word republic means
the public good, or the good of the whole, in contradistinction to
the . . . good . . . of one man."30 Samuel Adams, like Aristotle,
metaphorically compared the body politic to the body human.-1
Thomas Jefferson placed societal needs above individual interest:
"I [am] convinced [man] has no natural right in opposition to his
32
social duties.
In the early years of the Revolution, individual liberty was presumed to be synonymous with public liberty.33 For classical republicans, individual fulfillment came from "sharing in a collective autonomy, a collective freedom and glory. '3 4 Another aspect of the
classical vision of man as but a part of a larger whole was the notion of defining people by their social roles or functions. 5 This notion was echoed by the American republicans in their vision of the
differing virtue, and thus the differing functions, of the "few" and
the "many": the republicans envisioned a natural aristocracy.3 6
The classical design for virtue in government was thus a passion
for the public good. The American revolutionaries recognized, however, that such a scheme of government could work only where individual citizens were imbued with a civic virtue that required subordination of private interest to public good.37 Thomas Jefferson,
as noted earlier, opposed virtue to self-interest: "Self-love . . . is
2 See L. Banning, supra note 23, at 47; G. Wood, supra note 22, at 53-65.
30

Paine, Dissertations on Government, etc. (1786), in 1 The Complete Writings of

Thomas Paine 372-73 (P. Foner ed. 1945).
" See S. Adams, "Candidus," Feb. 3, 1776, in 3 Writings of Samuel Adams 266 (H. Cushing ed. 1906); 3 The Life and Works of John Adams 478-79 (C. Adams ed. 1865).
" Letter to Danbury Baptists, Jan. 1, 1802, in 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113
(H. Washington ed. 1864).
3 G. Wood, supra note 22, at 63; Katz, supra note 24, at 482.
34 H. Pitkin, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo
Machiavelli 81 (1984); see id. at 80-105.
3' See A. MacIntyre, supra note 5, at 114-22.
" See J. Pocock, supra note 22, at 515-17 (describing the republican conception of a "natural aristocracy" of the few, which would be discerned by the many democratically).
37 L. Banning, supra note 23, at 107; see J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 10, 12; H. Storing,
What the Anti-Federalists Were For 15-23 (1981); G. Wood, supra note 22, at 53-54; Howe,
Republican Thought and the Political Violence of the 1790s, in National Unity on Trial,
1781-1816, at 73, 81 (E.Ferguson ed. 1970).
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no part of morality. Indeed it is exactly its counterpart. It is the
sole antagonist of virtue, leading us constantly by our propensities
to self-gratification in violation of our moral duties to others." '
John Adams described the relationship between public and private
good:
Public virtue cannot exist in a nation without private, and public
virtue is the only foundation of republics. There must be a positive
passion for the public good, the public interest, honor, power, and
glory, established in the minds of the people, or there can be no
republican government, nor any real liberty; and this public passion must be superior to all private passions. Men must be ready,
they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their private
pleasures, passions, and interests, nay, their private friendships
and dearest connections, when they stand in competition with the
rights of society.3 9
The early republicans thus placed their faith in the virtue of the
populace. A republic was made and maintained by the character
and spirit of its people. 0 Jefferson wrote repeatedly that man was
innately moral.' 1
If private virtue was to ensure public good, however, the function of governmeht was to choose both the public good and the
private virtue that supported it, "to select the values that ought to
control public and private life.' 2 Although apparently little dis33 Letter to Thomas Law, supra note 15, at 1032-33.
39Letter to Mercy Warren, April 16, 1776, in The Selected Writings of John and John
Quincy Adams 57-58 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1946).
40 See G. Wood, supra note 22, at 52-53; Katz, supra note 24, at 482; see also Jefferson,
Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIX, at 225 (1803) ("It is the manners and spirit of a
people which preserve a republic ....

");

Jefferson, Letter to Elbridge Gerry, March 29,

1801, in 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 40, 43 (P. Ford ed. 1897) ("the steady character of
our countrymen is a rock to which we may safely moor").
41 The best example is a letter to his nephew written in 1787:
Man was destined for society. His morality therefore was to be formed to this object.
He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong merely relative to this. This sense is
as much a part of his nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling ....
It is given
to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree ....
It may be strengthened by
exercise, as may any particular limb of the body.
Letter to Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787, in 12 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 14 (J.Boyd ed.
1955); see Letter to John Adams, Oct. 14, 1816, in 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 73,
76 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1903); Letter to Thomas Law, supra note 15, at 1032.
42 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 31 (quotation from unedited manuscript at 5); see also
Micheman, Politics and Values or What's Wrong With Rationality Review, 13 Creighton L.
Rev. 487, 509 (1985) (in Rousseauean republican vision "values are an intended outcome of
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cussed, the anti-pluralist nature of republicanism follows inevitably from its anti-individualism. Only where the object of government is to promote individual goods and interests can diverse,
idiosyncratic value systems be accommodated. In the unitary community envisioned by classical republicans, both public good and
private virtue must be defined by the commonwealth as a whole.
Individual liberty may mean the right to pursue private goods;
public liberty must mean the right to participate in defiming public
good. Thus, an important object of republican government is the
structuring of a shared telos, a common value system for citizens
43
and their community.
This notion of community values was so closely tied to the notion of virtue itself that it was rarely made explicit. There are,
however, some indications in republican writings that a primary
end of government was to select the values that would promote a
virtuous citizenry. The chief object of government, according to
one anti-federalist, should be the "the attainment of virtue, and
happiness among ourselves."' 44 The anti-federalist insistence that
only a small, homogeneous republic could succeed also suggests the
anti-pluralist foundation of republicanism.4 5 Wisdom and judgment in both the populace and its representatives was seen as a
necessary prerequisite to good government. 4 6 Without these qualities, no nation could be expected to structure its values. The
American Senate, "the repositor[y] of classical republican honor
and wisdom, ' 47 served the same deliberative function. Moreover,

politics; they are public as well as private in origin, originating in political engagement and
dialogue as well as in private experience").

0' Diggins suggests that American republicanism failed in part because its sponsors lacked
such a moral vision or telos. J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 31.
"

"Brutus," Jan. 3, 1788, in The Anti-Federalist 145, 146 (H. Storing ed., abridgement by

M. Dry, 1985).
,1 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
46 J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 26-28.
47 G. Wood, supra note 22, at 209; see H. Storing, supra note 37, at 61 (discussing federalist responses to anti-federalist criticisms of separation of powers: "The sole intention of [the
separation] is to produce wise and mature deliberation."); G. Wood, supra note 22, at 20820. Although this is not, of course, the only function the republicans envisioned for the
Senate, even the property-protecting function of the upper house is a far cry from its function as envisioned by the liberal federalists:
The remedy for this inconveniency [the disproportionate strength of the legislature]
is, to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them by different
modes of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each
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the people's participation in the process of selecting values for the
community might itself foster individual virtue. A belief in an ordered system of values was thus both a corollary to and an outcome of a reliance on individual virtue.
The notion of common good maintained by a virtuous citizenry
was, however, beset by contradictions. Republicanism held that
true liberty could only be maintained by the security of property.
Yet property would beget wealth, which, when concentrated in the
hands of the few, would be destructive of virtue and freedom. Republicanism's predicament lay between the promotion of collective
liberty through a system of private property and fear of the corrupting influences of luxury. 48 In locating the authority of government in the governed, republicanism created another dilemma:
what would move an uncoerced citizenry to obey? 49 "The republican conundrum was thus how to change the flow of authority from
top-down to bottom-up; the republican solution was that obedience must be internalized." 50 Yet the doctrine of civic virtue provided only a partial answer. Jefferson, for example, in advocating
pursuit of the virtuous life, never confronted the potential conflict
51
between individual and societal definitions of virtue.
The new republicans also faced a problem unique to America.
Republics had always been small, and republicanism assumed that
only in small communities could there develop a homogeneity of
interest and passion for the public good. The American revolutionaries had to reconcile this republican ideal with the seemingly unlimited geography of the American continent.2 Finally, Americans
were wholly ambivalent about their own nature: did their rusticity
and distance from England make them "natural republicans," or

other, as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the
society, will admit.

The Federalist No. 51, at 350 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
48 See G. Wood, supra note 22, at 64-65; Katz, supra note 24. For attempted reconciliations of this tension, see J. Pocock, supra note 22, at 533-39; Katz, supra note 24.
49 See G. Wood, supra note 22, at 66-67; Katz, supra note 24, at 482.
11 Katz, supra note 24, at 482.
51 j Diggins, supra note 22, at 41-42.

11 For the classic formulation of this small republic theory, see C. Montesquieu, The
Spirit of the Laws 20-22, 40-48 (Paris 1748) (T. Nugent trans. 1949). For other discussions
of this theory, see L. Banning, supra note 23, at 107; J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 48-49, 65;
G. Wood, supra note 22, at 473, 502-05; Howe, supra note 37, at 84.
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was their virtue in jeopardy from within? 53 Despite these recognized problems, there seemed little doubt in 1776 that America
would be a republic, and all those committed to republicanism
54
shared essentially the theory of government described above.
By the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, that picture of virtually unanimous enthusiasm for classical republican
politics had changed drastically. The central factor in the crisis
was republicanism's utter dependence "upon a virtuous citizenry." 55 Republicanism was totally dependent on civic virtue to
obligate citizens to the public good. 6 In the years of the Articles of
Confederation, the founders began to reject the ideals of republicanism because of a perceived licentiousness and lack of virtue
among the people. At least as early as 1782, Hamilton attacked the
notion of republican virtue: "We may preach till we are tired of the
theme . . . . 5 Virtue, he warned in 1788, would become an appendage of wealth-only the wealthy, being more learned and of
better moral character than the poor, would maintain virtuous
practices.5 8 Man was selfish, and any hope for public interests
59
would have to come from private interests.
Hamilton, Madison, and others began to see human motivations,
rather than an education in virtue, as the means by which to control politics and society. The fear of popular corruption, and the
construction of government mechanisms to combat it, runs
throughout The Federalist and other contemporaneous writings.6 0
During the ratification debates, both the federalists and the antifederalists defended their position as the one better able to combat

53 See G. Wood, supra note 22, at 123.
54 Id. at 60, 91-93.
55 J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 24.
56 G. Wood, supra note 22, at 92.
1, The Continentalist No. 6, July 4, 1782 in 3 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 103 (H.
Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962).
8 Hamilton, Address before the New York Ratifying Convention of Poughkeepsie, New
York, June 21, 1788, in 5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 36, 42-43 (H. Syrett & J.
Cooke eds. 1962). Hamilton's notion that wealth would promote virtue shows how far the
nation's ideology had changed from the original fear of wealth as corruptive.
" See G. Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government 70-71
(1970).
60 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison); The Federalist No. 15, at 96 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions
of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint."); L. Banning, supra note 23, at 89-91; J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 87-98.

HeinOnline -- 72 Va. L. Rev. 557 1986

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 72:543

and control "the natural lust of power so inherent in man." 61
Even so staunch a republican as John Adams at times lost faith
in the people:
One is ... astonished at the reflection of Machiavel, 'Such was the
spirit of patriotism amongst them in those days, that they cheerfully gave up their private interests for the public good,' when
every page of his history shows, that the public good was sacrificed
everyday, by all parties, to their private interests, friendships,
62
enmities.

Thomas Jefferson, the patron saint of American republicanism,
may have experienced a similar disillusionment. As early as 1776,
he expressed doubts about the security of a classical republic: "The
fantastical idea of virtue and the public good being a sufficient security to the state. . .I assure you was never mine." 63 At least one
reading of his philosophy suggests that by the time of his presidency, he had thoroughly assimilated Madisonian liberalism.64
The federalists therefore hoped to create a republican government that did not require virtuous citizens for its sustenance.6 5 As-

suming that man would not be virtuous, they sought to change
human conduct even though human nature was fixed. 6 John Adams, for example, was intent on exploiting "talent and control[ling] power through the Christian sin of pride, utilizing the
61 George Mason of Virginia, in 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, at 32 (J.Elliot 2d ed. 1836); see Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The AntiFederalists on the Nature of Representative Government, in National Unity on Trial, 17811816, at 11, 20-21, 33-35 (E. Ferguson ed. 1970).
62 John Adams, 2 A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America 109 (1787-88).
63Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, Aug. 26, 1776, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 357 (M. Peterson ed. 1975); see also Letter to Dupont de Nemours, April 24, 1816, in
14 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 487 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1903) ("[T]he
human character ... requires in general constant and immediate control, to prevent its
being biased from right by the seductions of self-love.").
e
See L. Banning, supra note 23, at 89; Katz, supra note 24, at 487; cf. Appleby, supra
note 22, at 289-91 (Jefferson's infatuation with Montesquieu's theories was waning by 1790);
Grampp, A Reexamination of Jeffersonian Economics, in National Unity on Trial, 17811816, at 209 (E. Ferguson ed. 1970) (Jefferson's economic theories also changed).
B See The Federalist No. 51, at 351-52 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961);
L. Banning, supra note 23, at 99, 107; J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 6; D. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist 45 (1984); J. Pocock, supra note 22, at 522-23; G. Wood, supra
note 22, at 432, 473, 502-05, 535-47, 559-60; Katz, supra note 24, at 487.
68 G. Wood, supra note 22, at 475.
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love of praise as a surrogate for reason and virtue. ' 67 Adams abandoned the concept of virtue as a cause of a republic and a "wellordered constitution," instead seeing virtue as an effect of good
government.6 8 A well ordered constitution required a balance of
powers to check the tendency toward tyranny and corruption; an
unvirtuous citizenry could not be relied upon to do so.
Madison turned the large size of the new republic to his advantage by arguing that the size would prevent the formation of factions and thus protect the government from corruption. 9 Madison
was convinced that factions were due to the "unequal distribution
of property," which gave rise to "unfriendly passions" and "violent
conflicts. '7 0 Because this was the "natural" condition of man, the
Republic could be preserved only by the "machinery of government.17 1 If character would not save the Experiment, structure
would; if not virtue, operation. In an age of empiricism, the founders measured their ideal of a virtuous citizen against the citizens
of their time. The incongruence of ideal and reality led to a government based on a deeply pessimistic view of human nature as
irretrievably self-interested.72
In abandoning virtue as the basis of good government, the framers also shifted the purpose of government from perfecting human
virtue to promoting individual desires. Despairing of the nobility of
human nature, the founders constructed a constitutional structure
designed to withstand and cater to its baser aspects.7 3 The purpose
67 J.Diggins, supra note 22, at 71.

" Id. at 70-71.
19 See The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison); Sunstein, supra note 28.
7" The Federalist No. 10 at 59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
1 J.Diggins, supra note 22, at 53 (citing Federalist No. 51).
1- Gordon Wood's description of the depth of the transformation cannot be improved
upon:
[The Lockean] image of a social contract formed by isolated and hostile individuals
was now the only contractual metaphor that comprehended American social

reality.....
The Constitution represented both the climax and the fimale of the American
Enlightenment, both the fulfillment and the end of the belief that the endless variety
and perplexity of society could be reduced to a simple and harmonious system. By
attempting to formulate a theory of politics that would represent reality as it was, the
Americans of 1787 shattered the classical Whig world of 1776.
...

G. Wood, supra note 22, at 601-02, 606.
73 As stated by one commentator: "Between Machiavelli and Locke lies the dilemma of
American politics. Classical political philosophy aims to discipline man's desires and raise
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of government was to protect private aims and interests.7 4 The
"principal task of modern [l]egislation" was not the enobling of the
human spirit but "[t]he regulation of these various and interfering
'75
interests.
At best, this theory of government exalts the isolated individual
over the member of a community by shifting the function of government from promoting or perfecting human nature to protecting
the exercise of individual human nature. Both Madison and the
later Jefferson put this private, self-directed individual ahead of
the community. "Justice," wrote Madison, "is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. ' 7 Madison's conception of justice meant "the protection of each man's faculties,' 77 and thus rejected as a governmental function the deliberately selective
78
perfecting of those faculties.
A more cynical interpretation of The Federalistand of the Constitution it defends finds not even this regard for individual faculties, but rather an almost Hobbesian view of human existence as
"nasty, brutish and short. '7'9 Despite all the rhetoric in The Federalist about justice, the Constitution is defended primarily on its
ability to secure safety and prosperity. Jay introduced the first
fourteen papers as addressing the need to provide for "the preservation of peace and tranquility . . . against dangers from foreign
arms and influence, [and against] dangers of the like kind arising
from domestic causes." 80 Papers three through ten accordingly ad-

him far above his vulgar wants; liberalism promises to realize desires and satisfy wants. The
first is more noble, the second more attainable." J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 16.
7" There is some debate about whether man's private interests were primarily economic or
political. See generally D. Epstein, supra note 65. In either case, the interests were self-

centered, not altruistic, and thus inconsistent with republican virtue.
75 The Federalist No. 10, at 59 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
The Federalist No. 51, at 352 (J. Madison or A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
77 D. Epstein, supra note 65, at 86.
78 See id. at 79, 84-85, 162-63. Despite his thesis that Madison and the federalists also
sought to protect the good of the commonwealth, Epstein acknowledges that promoting individual faculties was Madison's "more fundamental end." Id. at 163. Jefferson's belief that
7'

the end of government was the promotion of individual capacities is more difficult to document by reference to specific passages, but one author has concluded that "Jefferson wanted
government to offer protection to the personal realm where men might freely exercise their
faculties." Appleby, supra note 22, at 293. How much Jefferson actually changed his views is
open to some debate.
71 T. Hobbes, Leviathan 97 (1952) (reprinted from 1651 ed.).
80 The Federalist No.3, at 13-14 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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dress the propensity of the proposed union to safeguard against
these dangers, and eleven through thirteen address the economic
advantages of union. In number fourteen, Madison summarized
the benefits of a union in language that again stresses security at
the expense of civilization:
We have seen the necessity of the union, as our bulwark against
foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the
guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only
substitute for those military establishments which have subverted
the liberties of the old world; and as the proper antidote for the
diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular governments, and
of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by
l
5
our own.

Protection of individual rights, when discussed in any but the most
rhetorical terms, is left to the states.8 2 Human potential and
human aspirations to higher values are left untouched. Even the
authors of The Federalist implicitly admitted that this is a sad
"reflection on human nature. 8 3
Based on the "psychology of temptation and the politics of suspicion, ' '8 4 the Constitution of 1787, and especially the Bill of
Rights of 1789, represent a triumph of modern liberalism over
classical republicanism.8 5 Individualism had become the founda81 The Federalist No. 14, at 83 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). To complete the triad,
Hamilton also described the objects of government similarly:.
The Principal purposes to be answered by Union are these-The common defence of
the members-the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks-the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States-the superintendence of our intercourse, political and-commercial,
with foreign countries.
The Federalist No. 23, at 146-47 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
81 See The Federalist No. 17, at 105-06 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (identifying
"the administration of private justice" as one of the reasons that state governments command greater popular affection and loyalty than will the federal government).
The Federalist No. 51, at 349 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 74.
s For a discussion of the liberal nature of the Constitution, see, e.g., G. Wood, supra note
22, at 430-564. But see infra note 149 (suggesting different interpretation of the Constitution). For detailed discussions of the liberal origins of parts of the first and fifth amendments, see Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 704-05 (1984); Note, Reinterpreting the Religion
Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of The Self, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1468,
1471-72, 1475-85 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses]; see
also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 53 U.S.L.W. 4947, 4965 n.18 (U.S.
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tion of the Republic,8" whereas in 1776 it was anathema to it. Because the ancient republics had died, and because it appeared that
this new republic might also succumb to corruption, Americans
adopted the individualism of Locke over the Republic of
7
Machiavelli and Harrington.8
This early American partiality to an individualist ideology foreshadowed a jurisprudential tradition that has lasted almost two
centuries. Individual autonomy serves as the underlying paradigm
for virtually the entire modern American jurisprudential tradition.
The next section of this article attempts to demonstrate that the
three major schools of contemporary American jurisprudence, although they differ on virtually everything else, share this common
paradigm. 88

1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A]ll of the checks and balances [of the Constitution] are
consistent with the interest in protecting individual liberty from the possible misuse of
power by a transient unrestrained majority.").
8 Madison wrote that it might be "unfavorable to liberty" if each individual were to
become "insignificant . . . in his own eyes." National Gazette, Dec. 19, 1791, in 14 The
Papers of James Madision 170 (R. Rutland, T. Mason, et. al. eds. 1983).
87 At least one interpretation suggests that the classical paradigm was once again briefly
and unsuccessfully revived in the anti-federalist triumph of 1800. See L. Banning, supra
note 23, at 273-302. On both sides of the Atlantic, the classical paradigm survived underground-in literature-for a time after its political demise. See generally R. Ferguson, Law
& Letters in American Culture 96-195 (1984) (reviewing the strains in American literature
during the early 1800's.); R. Eldridge, supra note 13.
88 What follows in the text is necessarily a highly simplified description of the three
schools of jurisprudence. I have, however, tried to retain the essence of each school. For an
insightful elaboration upon liberalism and radicalism, as described in the text, see Shiffrin,
Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1103 (1983). I am identifying Robert Nozick as the prime example of the third, neo-conservative school, which is not
included in Shiffrin's analysis.
At least one political philosopher has drawn paradigm lines quite differently. In his introduction to a collection of essays on Nozick's theories, Jeffrey Paul identifies Rawls' "distributivist liberalism" as the "current ideological paradigm" and suggests that Nozick's vision of the minimal state is "a wholly new conceptual paradigm." Reading Nozick: Essays on
Anarchy, State, and Utopia 2 (J. Paul ed. 1981). My thesis is that Nozick and Rawls share
the deeper underlying paradigm of autonomy, which cannot be perceived absent the illumination of a contrasting, classical paradigm. Anthony Kronman also has noticed the common
grounding of the otherwise different schools of jurisprudence; he notes that Bruce Ackerman, Roberto Unger, and Richard Posner all adhere to "some independent scheme of values
based only upon reason and a few elementary propositions regarding the nature of the
human species." Kronman, supra note 10, at 1572.
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III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE MODERN PARADIGM: FROM
NOZICK

A.

To

UNGER

Conservative Jurisprudence:Nozick

Robert Nozick's minimal state is an archetypal example of the
consequences of an individualistic philosophy. He identifies as his
"root idea" the fact that "there are different individuals with separate lives," and asserts that all valid moral and political philosophy
must "reflect the fact of our separate existences." 89 The minimal
state is merely a method of allowing each individual to reach the

highest form of individuality:
The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals... ; it treats
us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes .... [This treatment] allows us, individually or with whom
we choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity. How
dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less.90
Nozick denies entirely the validity of any doctrine that recognizes connection or community as a separate and valuable
principle:
But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good?
Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or
sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm ....
In
each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the overall social good.
* . .But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some
sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of
these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits others.
Nothing more. 91
Nozick thus perfectly illustrates the first tension between the mod-

" R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 33 (1974); see Nagel, Libertarianism Without
Foundations, in Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 191, 193 (J. Paul
ed. 1981).
90R. Nozick, supra note 89, at 333-34.
91Id. at 32-33. This rejection of the concept of a social entity, distinct from the individuals who make it up, is not limited to Nozick; at least one of his severest critics belittles the
idea of a social entity while affirming the necessity of balancing harms and benefits. See
Nagel, supra note 89, at 197; see also J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 264 (1971) (using individualistic concepts to develop a concept of community).
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ern and classical traditions: his minimalist state is based on a
wholly atomistic philosophy, with no room for collectivity.
This preference for individualism and its concomitant need for
mediating devices is also embodied in the contemporary law and
economics movement: "The economist rejects absolutes: what is
good is what the individual prefers; a good society is one that maximizes freedom of choice. The economists' values speak to the
question of how society should be organized in order to satisfy individual desires, whatever they may be." 92
B. Liberal Jurisprudence:Rawls and Dworkin
The essence of the myriad traditions that make up modern liberalism is also atomistic. That liberal political philosophy takes autonomy as an underlying principle is almost a truism.93 Ronald
Dworkin has recognized that liberal theories, including both his
own and that of Rawls, are what he calls "rights-based", as opposed to "goal-based.

based

theories9"

94

As he explains the distinction, rights-

"place the individual at the center," while goal-

"'Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 Ind. L.J. 426, 452 (1975).
0' For statements in general support of the proposition, see, e.g., J. Elshtain, supra note
19, at 14-16; M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 11; R. Unger, Knowledge & Politics 21-22 (1975);
Dworkin, supra note 7, at 259-65; Eisenstein, The Sexual Politics of the New Right: Understanding the "Crisis of Liberalism" for the 1980s, in Feminist Theory: A Critique of Ideology 77, 79 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, & B. Gelpi eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Feminist
Theory]; Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 247, 256 (1984);
Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of The Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 276 & n.36 (1978); Nagel, supra note 89; Richards, Human Rights and Moral Ideals: An Essay on the Moral Theory of Liberalism, 5 Soc.
Theory & Prac. 461, 465 (1980); Shiffrin, supra note 88, at 1145 & n.144; Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
781, 783-85 (1983); Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 85, at 1471. But
see F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 47-48 (1982)(noting that much of
liberal doctrine emphasizes "the interests of society at large rather than... the interests of
the individual). Isaiah Berlin drew an illuminating distinction between autonomy and heteronomy, or dependence on the external world, suggesting that the former, although not exclusive, is the "essence" of mankind. I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty 21-22 (1958); accord, Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1392 (1984).
9' See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 168-77, 204-05; M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 66, 138.
95 Dworkin also identifies another type of individualist theory as "duty-based". The main
difference between the two is that a rights-based theory focuses on the individual's independence of choice, while a duty-based theory is concerned with the individual's adherence to a
moral standard. Both, unlike goal-based theories, are centered on the individual, and the
two differ only in whether the emphasis is on individual conformity or individual indepen-
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based theories are more concerned with community well-being
than with individual welfare.9 6 Although Dworkin admits that this
classification is rather crude, it serves to highlight the difference
between the individualistic modern paradigm and the communitarian classical paradigm.
The connection between liberalism and an atomistic conception
of self goes much deeper than the difference between rights-based
and goal-based theories of justice. The very primacy of justice in
the liberal political philosophy is itself a manifestation of liberals'
concern for individual values over fraternal values.9 7 Michael
Sandel's telling critique of John Rawls' theory of justice illustrates
how an obsession with justice is only necessary in an ethos in
which individuals are seen as separate and in conflict.9 8 Rawls, like
Dworkin, builds his entire jurisprudence around an individualistic
conception of human nature. 9 He rejects utilitarianism because it
"does not take seriously the distinction between persons, ' 10° and
devises a "veil of ignorance" to ensure that those who would agree

dence. Dworkin, supra note 7, at 171-72. Modern duty-based theories are comparatively
rare. They might be characterized as a less mature version of either a rights-based or a goalbased theory. See infra notes 202-209 and accompanying text.
" Dworkin, supra note 7, at 172.
'9 As described by Michael Sandel:
'Deontological liberalism' is above all a theory about justice, and in particular about
the primacy of justice among moral and political ideals. Its core thesis can be stated
as follows: society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims,
interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good ....
See M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 1. Although Sandel offers a persuasive critique of Rawls'
deontological individualism, his own project is less successful because he fails to adequately
integrate community and intersubjectivity into his political theory. See Sagoff, Book Review: The Limits of Justice, 92 Yale L.J. 1065, 1080 (1983) (reviewing M. Sandel, supra note
3).
.. Sandel contrasts Rawls' well-ordered society, with its emphasis on distributive justice,
with the family, in which altruism and concern for others obviate the need for a developed
theory of justice; he suggests that enforcing "justice" in a family situation is in fact destructive. M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 33; see Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of
Rights?, 94 Ethics 441, 447 (1984); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology
and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983).
9 See, e.g., J. Rawls, supra note 91, at 251-57, 264; M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 10-11, 5152, 61-64, 133, 148-49 (1982); Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of
A Theory of Justice 1, 9-10 (N. Daniels ed. 1974).
100J. Rawls, supra note 91, at 27.
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to the basic terms of his contractarian system of justice remain uninfluenced by social constraints. 10 1
Moreover, one of the constraints of Rawls' "original position"
(the blind state of nature from which he derives the contractual
terms of justice) is that the participants are mutually disinterested,
without reason to further the interests of others. 102 The depth of
Rawls' attachment to this individuated conception of the self may
be seen in his characterization of benevolence as a "second-order"
notion. Determined to incorporate only widely shared propositions
into his original position, Rawls assumes with little argument that
benevolence, or concern for the interests of others, is not sufficiently embedded in human nature to find a place in the original
position. 0 3 The modern paradigm exalts a devotion to one's own
interests; a contemporary version of the classical paradigm, on the
other hand, might consider benevolence a widely shared human
trait.
Dworkin denies, although not very convincingly, that his version
of liberalism adopts an atomistic or individualistic view of human
nature.0 4 Rawls does not deny that his theory is individualistic but
argues that it is not incompatible with communitarian ideals. 0 5
The main premise of his argument for community is that only
through union with others can an individual become complete. 10 8
Even this premise, however, is a weak endorsement of communitarian values because, as Sandel has noted, it presupposes distinct
individuals with different needs and interests as the measuring
unit. 0 7 Moreover, Rawls' premise that individuals "are to deliber101See Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies of A Theory
of Justice 169, 171 (N. Daniels ed. 1974). Scanlon himself notes that an individualistic conception of persons "may not be absolute," nor is the conception itself "formed outside of or
independent of particular social and historical circumstances." Id. at 178. This admission,
coupled with Scanlon's suggestion that despite the conception's contextual nature, it is "uncontroversial" in this "era and civilization," illustrates the pervasiveness of the modern paradigm. See id.
102 See J. Rawls, supra note 91, at 127-29.
103 Id. at 191. Rawls dismisses concern for the interests of others as "extensive ties of
natural sentiment." Id. at 129. Sandel criticizes Rawls' relegation of benevolence to "secondorder" status. M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 171.
10,Dworkin, supra note 7, at 142.
105 See Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 Philos. Rev. 536 (1975).
101 See J. Rawls, supra note 91, at 523; M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 61.
107 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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ate as if they prefer more rather than less primary goods,"' 0 8 already incorporates an unconnected view of human nature, in which
self-interest is paramount to altruism.
At base, liberal moral theory is individualistic largely because it
excludes any intersubjective conceptions of self;10 9 without an intersubjective self, the contours of the conflict between individual
and community are antecedently determined. Although modern
liberalism may recognize the necessity of connection, it emphasizes
individualism to such an extent that wherever the two conflict-as
they are bound to doll 0 -it is the modern and not the classical paradigm that prevails."' The depth of contemporary adherence to
the atomism of the modern paradigm may be illustrated by Edwin
Baker's comment that "most people in the post-Enlightenment
2
world" will accept the basic Rawlsian premise of autonomy."
In addition to a decidedly individualist bias, liberal jurisprudence exhibits two other traits characteristic of the modern paradigm: liberalism epitomizes an abstract, rule-based theory, and liberalism is a highly pluralistic philosophy. In a world of selfinterested individuals, abstract rules or principles are a necessary
alternative to such contextual moral notions as virtue. 1 3 Dworkin's
own notion of rights as "trump" is characteristic of liberal theories:
in the game of life, we must find fair rules to play by.11 4 The central idea of the liberal perspective is that of entitlement: "distinct
individuals have interests that they are entitled to protect if they
Rawls, supra note 105, at 543.
supra note 3.
110 See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy- The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale L. J. 1063 (1981); Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 205, 211-12 (1979); Shapiro, Fathers and Sons:
The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in The Burger Court: The
Counter-Revolution That Wasn't 218, 223-33 (V.Blasi ed. 1983).
"I For example, while Rawls defines rights as the absence of restrictions and sets a minimal subsistence level for all members of society, he does not allow certain morally irrelevant
factors, such as intelligence, luck, or a certain amount of economic good fortune, to count as
"restrictions." As long as the worst off groups are better off in an absolute sense with these
restrictions than they would be without them, his distributivist principles have been satisfied. See J. Rawls, supra note 91, at 75-78, 204, 224-26, 277-78. His theory of justice thus
places "absolute well-being" above "relative share," see D. Richards, supra note 4, at 48,
emphasizing the individualist rather than relational cast of his theory.
. Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 895, 924 (1985).
'1 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
114 Dworkin, supra note 7, at xi.
108

zo, See
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so wish."1 5 The scope of individual entitlement, of course, varies
with each theory. Dworkin, among many others, finds a right to
"equality.""" The basic Rawlsian right is "fairness"-which takes
some six hundred pages to define. Still other theories list various
individual liberties as rights. Each of these definitions of rights or
entitlements, however, shares the common feature of abstractness.
Once the entitlement is defined and the neutral principles specified, it remains only to follow the rules laid down.
The classical perspective, because it is less constrained by the
fascination for "distinctness," can encompass a broader notion of
what we owe to others as extensions of ourselves. Virtues, unlike
rights, can be defined contextually. It may, for example, be virtuous to abort a child whose life will be filled with physical pain, and
less virtuous to abort a child simply because he or she is of the
"wrong" gender. Liberalism recognizes only that the woman has a
right to an abortion (or that the fetus has a right to life), regardless
of the circumstances. The notion of compassion further illustrates
the difference between a right and a virtue because what constitutes compassion depends on the circumstances. Compassion may
sometimes be a virtue; being the object of compassion can never be
117
a right.
Liberalism is also a quintessentially pluralistic philosophy. With
no human telos against which to measure different theories of
rights, liberalism has no hierarchy of values. A liberal state is
therefore required to remain neutral toward its citizens' diverse
and competing definitions of the good life."18 Liberalism thus be-

115

Id. at 176.

Id. at 272-78.
Judith Jarvis Thomson draws a similar distinction between rights (with their correlative duties) and moral virtues, or "oughts." See Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 47, 60-62 (1971).
118See, e.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 10-12; A. MacIntyre, supra note 5, at 11, 23537; M. Sandel, supra note 3; Dworkin, supra note 7; Heller, The Importance of Normative
Decisionmaking, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 385, 475; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037-38 (1980). Although David A.J. Richards argues that liberals are free to criticize others' moral choices, he
admits that the state must remain neutral: criticism is acceptable, penalties are not. Richards, supra note 93. Robin West has developed an intriguing theory of "pragmatic liberalism," which is committed to an evolving but non-neutral definition of the good life. West,
Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
673 (1985). Whether or not it is a viable approach, it is definitely not a liberal approach.
116
117
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comes mired in such endless conflicts as those between negative
and positive rights, and between liberty and equality. 119
C. Radical Jurisprudence:CLS and Unger
It is more difficult to see how the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) embodies the individualist paradigm. One might
read that movement's ideology to reject the modern paradigm of
autonomy in favor of the communitarian paradigm suggested here.
Shiffrin notes that "democratic radicals" (his encompassing nomenclature for the critical legal scholars) criticize liberalism for being "excessively individualistic."

20

Roberto Unger explicitly de-

nounces the liberal dichotomy between individual and society and
seeks to reconcile the two under the ideal of sympathy. 2 ' Mark
Tushnet has offered a powerful critique of the liberal theory of
rights. 22 On closer examination, however, even the critical legal
scholars vacillate between endorsement of a communitarian perspective and mere tinkering with the liberal perspective. Moreover,
despite their desire to expose the underlying contextuality of the
abstract propositions of liberalism, they exhibit a characteristically
modern tendency toward abstraction. 12 Finally, the contrast be"'

See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 7, at 123; Nagel, supra note 89.

,2 Shiffrin, supra note 88, at 1109.
121 R. Unger, supra note 93, at 191-235. For examples of attempts to perform this reconciliation in a specific legal context, see, e.g., Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 Yale L. J. 149 (1971); Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses, supra note 85.
"' Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 93; see Kennedy, Critical Labor Law Theory:.

A Comment, 4 Indus. Rel. L. J. 503 (1981).
123 See Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing From Feminist Jurisprudence and
Critical Theory, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 59, 65 (1985) ("by building abstraction upon abstraction, the trashers approach the kinds of formalism and idealism that they set out to critique"). The following exchange provides a delightful illustration of the masculine abstraction of radical scholarship:
Morris: It's a very crude kind of historicism he's peddling, surely? And bad
aesthetics.
Hilary: This is all very fascinating, I'm sure, but could we discuss something a little
more practical? Like what the four of us are going to do in the immediate future?
Desiree: It's no use, Hilary. Don't you hear the sound of men talking?
Morris: (to Philip) The paradigms of fiction are essentially the same whatever the
medium. Words or images, it makes no difference at the structural level.
Desiree: 'The structural level,' 'paradigms.' How they love those abstract words.
'Historicism'!
D. Lodge, Changing Places 250-51 (1975). Astute readers might ask why this article itself
contains an abundance of references to paradigms and structures. As Carol Gilligan has
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tween the classical paradigm and the critical legal scholars is most
marked in the absence of any teleological underpinnings to modern
radical scholarship.
Roberto Unger perhaps best exemplifies the radical effort to recognize and resolve the tension between autonomy and heteronomy. 124 Unger's attempted synthesis of individual and community
captures the spirit of the conflict inherent in any attempt to reintegrate the classical tradition into the modern paradigm. Although he is fundamentally unable to suggest a realistic method
for achieving this synthesis, 1 25 his discussion of the liberal failure
to credit the relational aspect of the self indentifies liberalism with
the modern perspective.
Even Unger, however, is unable to overcome the peculiarly modern attachment to a strong notion of individualism and autonomy.
He warns of the consequences of too strong a commitment to connection: "The relational view threatens our ability to identify individuals or mankind. Because everything is ultimately connected
with everything else, there would be no place to set the boundaries
of individual or species nature.' 1 26 He continues that theme in his
more recent book:
We present to one another both an unlimited need and an unlimited danger, and the very resources by which we attempt to satisfy
the former aggravate the latter ....
...Each of [our] ventures into a life of longing for other people
noted, women's fluency in the masculine voice "must correlate with educational attainment
in society." DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon, & Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buff. L. Rev., 11, 59 (1985) (Gilligan)
[hereinafter cited as DuBois].
124 See Hutchinson & Monahan, The "Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 Tex.
L. Rev. 1477 (1984) (suggesting that Unger provides a coherent and elaborate formulation).
125 Unger appears to suggest, irrationally, that the community needs to be both limited in
number and encompassing of all humanity. R. Unger, supra note 93, at 221. He also labels
the ideal of sympathy-by which'the reconciliation of self and community is achieved-as a
"dreamt-of circumstance," id. at 217, perhaps suggesting that he recognizes the apparent
impossibility of achieving such a reconciliation absent a new paradigm to illuminate the
way. Other critical legal scholars also appear to recognize the current hopelessness of their
utopian vision. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293, 296 n.11 (1984); Kennedy,
supra note 110, at 212-13.
126 R. Unger, supra note 93, at 194. In another passage he seems equally despairing of the
consequences of too much emphasis on either half of the dichotomy- "It is the experience of
the conflict between the hope that one might think for oneself and the need to be understood or, to rephrase it in a stronger and negative form, between the fear of enslavement
and the fear of madness." Id. at 215.
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threatens to create a craven dependence and to submerge
our indi127
vidual selves under group identities and social roles.

Other critical legal scholars appear equally unable to -confront the
classical paradigm of connection without real terror. Duncan Kennedy, for example, has suggested that "at the same time that it
forms and protects us, the universe of others . . . threatens us
with annihilationand urges upon us forms of fusion that are quite
128
plainly bad rather than good.
The radical position on the notion of individual rights is similarly ambivalent. Trashing liberalism and its attendant theory of
rights is a favorite CLS pastime, but it "appears to be directed
more at exposing the injustice of contemporary social relations
than at denigrating the core idea of human rights."' 29 Tushnet, for
example, devotes a large portion of his critique of rights theory to
demonstrating the potential for misuse of "rights-talk."1 1s0 Peter
Gabel has attempted to justify and transform the concept of rights
for the achievement of radical ends.""' Unger's own program contains a revised vision of rights as they would exist in his reconstituted society.'3 2 Although one motif of the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies is the identification of the inevitable contextuality of
our world, the amplification of this theme leads CLS into variations on modern rights theory.
The ultimate failure of the radical project confirms the final difference between the modern and classical paradigms. Radical jurisprudence attempts to reconcile the individual and community
R. Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality 20 (1984).
Kennedy, supra note 110, at 212 (emphasis added); see Baker, supra note 112, at 897
(criticizing Sandel's notion of the group subject because it "could provide the basis for a
dangerous and unwarranted notion of group or community rights"); Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 281, 288 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982) ("one of the most threatening aspects of social existence [is] the danger posed by
other people"); cf. Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 124, at 1499 & n.105 (decrying Unger's optimism that a reconstituted society would choose the "right" values: "This optimistic
leap of faith ... has little basis in history.").
I' Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 124, at 1487; see id. at 1482-89. The CLS position
on rights is not only ambivalent, it is often unintelligible. See, e.g., Gabel & Kennedy, Roll
Over Beethoven, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 37-41 (1984).
M Tushnet, An Essay in Rights, supra note 93, at 1386-94.
" Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563 (1984).
13'See, e.g., Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 597-602,
611-15 (1983).
127
28
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without any sense of what it is to be a member of a human community. The critical legal scholars, in their haste to deconstruct
the world, have neglected to construct a human telos. Alasdair
MacIntyre suggests that what the modern world lacks is a normative description of human aspiration: the Enlightenment, in rejecting Aristotelian teleology, destroyed the context of moral philosophy. Without such a context, post-Enlightenment moral
theories were doomed to failure from the outset. 13 3 John Diggins
ascribes the failure of American republicanism to the same lack:
"Ultimately the idea of virtue had no determinative content, no
transcendent quality that stood over and against the objective
world of power and interests, no moral vision that inspired the in13 4
dividual to identify with values higher than his own interests.1
Radical jurisprudence is in this regard no different. Despite its
claim of being a new paradigm, it is ultimately little more than a
rejection of the old one: it is substantively empty because it has no
teleological content. The reason for adopting a critical or radical
approach, Tushnet has suggested, is because such a stance "is defined as the party in opposition to what exists. 13 5 The Conference
on Critical Legal Studies seem to be, as one author has described
the modernist movement in art, "less an argument for a particular
style than a reaction against the traditional modes .... "1136
Unger's work is again instructive because his is the most ambitious attempt to construct a post-modern paradigm by reintegrating the classical paradigm. After criticizing the liberal ideology,
he attempts to construct a positive description of its successor137
He begins by sketching out the "social consciousness"1 38 and outward manifestations of an unliberal state but concludes that such a
survey "fails to supply a standard by which to judge the merits of
the contending views and ideals."13 9 He thus recognizes that, without a definition of the transcendent quality of humanity, no at1 See A. MacIntyre, supra note 5 at 49-59.
j.Diggins, supra note 22, at 31.
J34
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 93, at 1398.
Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger's Passion,98 Harv. L. Rev. 1066, 1077
(1985).
"I See R. Unger, supra note 93, at 174.
138 He uses "social consciousness" to mean something very like what Kuhn calls a paradigm: "The concept of social consciousness refers to a widely shared way of conceiving society and its relation to nature and to individuals." Id. at 148.
139 Id. at 181.
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tempt to revive the notion of man as part of a community can
succeed.
When he tries to define such a transcendent quality, however,
his attachment to modern individualism defeats the project from
the outset. His explication suffers from two fundamental theoretical problems, which serve to turn his attempt at a positive description into yet another negative one.
First, he defines the universal quality of humanity as that of "a
predicament rather than that of a substance.' 14 0 What characterizes a human telos seems to be, for Unger, not the striving for a
particular goal but the necessity of struggle in and of itself. In a
later work, Passion,he makes this explicit: virtue consists in "context-smashing," or going beyond social context, and the human
telos is context-transcendance itself.14 1 It does not seem to matter
where we go, just that we keep moving. There is thus no substan142
tive content to his teleology.
Second, he subscribes to the modern notion that a description of
human nature is factual while any specification of a human telos is
normative. The major project of Passion is to justify the discredited leap of faith from fact to value, 4s and to show that normative
values can be derived from factual premises. What Diggins and
MacIntyre appear to recognize, which Unger does not, is that a
Id. at 195-96.
See R. Unger, supra note 127, at 88-89. To say that Unger makes anything "explicit"
may be to accord his work both more and less credit than it is due. What he says is that the
Christian-romantic ethic is "corrigible" to the extent that it incorporates and reconciles a
notion of empowerment. Id. at 69-76. He then states:
Philosophy conceived in this spirit is simply context-smashing. . . .If someone were
to ask us why we want to live in the present in this way, we should answer: first,
because this is the kind of being we really are and, second, because by living in this
fashion we empower ourselves individually and collectively.
Id. at 88-89.
'' In this, Unger echoes the liberal emphasis on process as the most important human or
jurisprudential value. See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); Tribe, Ways Not to
Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L.J. 1315,
1338 (1974). Again, the radical scholars often criticize the liberal reliance on process but
seem ultimately to endorse process over substance themselves.
143 The most explicit declaration of Unger's underlying adherence to the dichotomy between facts about human nature and prescriptions about human conduct lies in frequent
references to attributing normative force or normative consequences to conceptions of
human nature or identity. This disjunction between a conception and its implications
strongly suggests that he believes the former to be "fact" and the latter "value." See, e.g., R.
Unger, supra note 127, at 3, 21, 40-41, 43, 78.
140
141
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description of human nature must also be normative insofar as it
presupposes "the existence of reasons for human action that are
not contingent upon any desires or purposes that men actually
have but are intrinsically authoritative. 1 44 In other words, what
MacIntyre calls "untutored human nature" cannot be understood
except in the context of the normative "human-nature-as-it-could145
be-if-it-realised-its-telos.'
The urge to ground a prescriptive theory of human ends in concrete human fact is an instance of the second, rarer form of modernism's rejection of immanent telos: there must be an abstract
quality out there somewhere, called "human nature," to which we
can anchor our normative schemes: "The temptation to place the
moral foundations of society in a pre-existing state of nature reflects the powerful wish to give one's favored scheme of values a
precision and unconditional legitimacy that put it safely beyond
the realm of political controversy. 14 6 A contextual paradigm recognizes that normative schemes, embedded in society and social
roles, are all there are.
IV. REVIVING THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM
There has recently been a resurgence of interest in the classical
paradigm. In addition to the critical legal scholars, who do not explicitly identify their project with either Aristotelianism or republicanism, scholars in a number of disciplines are evidencing renewed interest in the classical paradigm. The best known modern
Aristotelian is Alasdair MacIntyre, who argues quite cogently that
a return to a morality grounded on a human telos and human virtues is the only solution to modern dilemmas. 147 Modern Jeffer1 48
sonians abound and come in every imaginable political variety.
144

J.Diggins, supra note 22, at 31.

145A. MacIntyre, supra note 5, at 51.
146
147

Kronman, supra note 10, at 1603.
A. MacIntyre, supra note 5; see P. Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral

Philosophy (1978); I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (1971). It is interesting that of
these most prominent modern classicists, one is explicitly Christian in outlook, see supra
note 19, and two are women, see infra note 166.
141 See R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Praxis (1983); F. Dallmayr, Polis and Praxis: Exercises in Contemporary Political Theory
(1984); Sunstein, supra note 28. Diggins characterizes the scholarship as an effort to "rescue
America from liberalism." J. Diggins, supra note 22, at 19. Justice Powell, the only native
Virginian on the Supreme Court, has explicitly adopted a Jeffersonian view of the historical
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The most common theme of the new republicans is to suggest that
should
our republican heritage is embodied in the Constitution and
1 49
be relevant to modern interpretations of that document.
The renewed interest in the classical paradigm raises two important questions. The first, not dealt with in this article, seeks the
causes for this resurgence of a long-dormant philosophy. The second concerns the future of classical theory. A political or moral
philosophy based on virtue and community has failed at least once
and perhaps as many as four times.150 What is the likelihood that
modern Aristotelianism will ultimately prove more persuasive than
its predecessor or that the current variations on republicanism, unlike the Jeffersonian vision, may realistically be implemented?""
Classical republicanism has always been identified as a backwardlooking tradition; 152 is there any way to make it more forwardcircumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution, arguing that promoting the general welfare was a primary motivation for the Constitution. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S.
Ct. 1054, 1075 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting). What is particularly interesting, in light of the
thesis of this article, is that Justice O'Connor was the only other justice to join his opinion.
14' Cass Sunstein, for example, suggests that Madisonian liberalism seeks safeguards
against the "naked preferences" of individuals and powerful interest groups. Sunstein, supra
note 28, at 82; see Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1689 (1984). David Epstein's careful exigesis of The Federalist attempts to demonstrate
that its authors were concerned not only with private rights but also with the public good as
an end of government. See D. Epstein, supra note 65. Similarly, Jonathan Macey has suggested that the Constitution was designed to be "public-regarding" in the sense that it was
designed to favor the interests of the polity over the desires of special-interest groups. Like
the framers, however, Macey relies on the structure of the Constitution, rather than on
human virtue, to achieve this object; he explicitly eschews any reliance on virtue. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest-Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986).
150 The Enlightenment constitutes the first, undisputed transition from the classical to
the modern paradigm. Various interpretations of American history suggest that the drafting
of the Constitution in 1787 and the fading of the anti-federalists of the early nineteenth
century constitute two more failures of the classical paradigm. See supra notes 21-87 and
accompanying text. Finally, a number of scholars have suggested that the critical legal studies movement has failed in its attempt to integrate the classical paradigm. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 93, at 261-62, 285; Leff, Book Review, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 879 (1977); Shiffrin,
supra note 88, at 1110 & n.33, 1179-87.
" John Diggins, for example, deplores Lockean liberalism but rejects the possibility of a
revival of republicanism based on what he sees as a non-existent Jeffersonian heritage, advocating instead a Calvinist approach. See J. Diggins, supra note 22; Wood, Hellfire Politics,
New York Review of Books, Feb. 28, 1985, at 29. Mark Tushnet suggests that regardless of
the framers' ideology, "it is unclear that the republican tradition is readily available to us."
Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1502, 1540
(1985).
"' See, e.g., Berthoff, Independence and Attachment, Virtue and Interest: From Republi-
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looking and thus more viable? In particular, this article addresses
the question whether a republican-inspired interpretation of the
United States Constitution is either possible or distinct from current interpretations.
It is tempting to ascribe the death of virtue to an inevitable
human progression, both personal and political."5 3 Such a thesis
may be bolstered by traditional theories of individual moral development, which suggest that individuals progress from a morality of
self-centeredness through a morality of other-centeredness to a
15 4
fully mature morality based on abstract, universal principles.
There is a striking parallel between the modern paradigm of political philosophy and such a mature individual morality. Lawrence
Kohlberg describes the mature or "postconventional" stage in
stunningly individualistic and abstract (i.e., modern) terms:
To count as postconventional, . . . terms [like "rights"] must be
used in a way that makes it clear that they have a foundation for a
rational or moral individual who has not yet committed himself to
any group or society or its morality.155[The value] perspective [is
that] of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to
social attachments and contracts. 156 [At this stage, the]
[p]rinciples are universal principles of justice .... 157
Perhaps the similarity between the modern paradigm and
Kohlberg's highest stage of moral development is best captured in
his description of the postconventional stage as embodying a
"prior-to-society" individual perspective. 15
The classical tradition, on the other hand, is marked by the
"other-centeredness" characteristic of the middle stages of development. The similarity is illustrated by the quotation from Jeffercan Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 1787-1837, in Uprooted Americans: Essays to Honor Oscar
Handlin 97, 101-102 (R. Bushman ed. 1979); Kramnick, supra note 22, at 631; Murrin, supra
note 27, at 406. Cass Sunstein also suggests-and then attempts to refute-that republicanism might be too "romantic and outmoded" for the modern world. See Sunstein, supra note
28, at 76, 82.
153 See, e.g., R. Unger, supra note 93, at 244-53.
14 See Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in Moral Development and Behavior- Theory, Research, and Social Issues 31 (T.
Lickona ed. 1976).
155 Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
156 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
157

Id.

155 Id. at 33.
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son cited earlier: "Self-interest, or rather self-love, or egoism, has
been more plausibly substituted as the basis of morality. But I
consider our relations with others as constituting the boundaries of
morality. ' 159 Kohlberg describes the middle stage of maturity (the
"conventional" level) as marked by "see[ing] things from the point
of view of shared relationships between two or more individuals."le He also describes this level repeatedly in terms of subordination of individual interests to societal needs:
[The identifying characteristics of the conventional stage are] (1)
concern about social approval; (2) concern about loyalty to persons,
groups, and authority; and (3) concern about the welfare of others
and society ....
What fundamentally defines and unifies the
characteristics of the conventional level is its social perspective, a
shared viewpoint of the participants in a relationship or a group.
The conventional individual subordinates the needs of the single
individual to the viewpoint and needs of the group or the shared
relationship.1 8"
Jefferson's rejection of self-interest in favor of a morality based on
others might be viewed as a transition from the earliest (selfish)
stages of morality to the middle stages. The transition from the
other-centeredness of republicanism to the abstraction of liberalism thus might be seen to represent a transition to the highest
stages. Under this theory, the rejection of the classical paradigm
simply represents a maturing process, and attempts to revive it
will ultimately fail unless some radically new factor is present.
Newer theories of moral development suggest, however, that the
modern and classical paradigms do not simply mirror consecutive
stages of moral development, but instead reflect a continuing
human tension at both the personal and political levels.16 2 If the
tension between autonomy and heteronomy is newly resolvable
every generation, and individual resolution of the tension largely
determines what that generation's dominant philosophy will be,
are we likely to resolve the tension any differently than earlier gen"' Letter to Thomas Law, supra note 15, at 1032.
110 Kohlberg, supra note 154, at 38.
1
Id. at 33-36; see also id. at 34-35 (table of six moral stages).
161 See N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology
of Gender (1978); D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements
and the Human Malaise (1976); C. Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development (1982).
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erations? To avoid the Scylla of liberalism's overemphasis on autonomy and the Charybdis of the neoclassical tendency to romanticize the community and subsume the individual, we must reconcile
the modern and classical traditions, not simply replace the former
with the latter. 6 s None of the authors discussed so far offers a
means by which that reconciliation can take place without, as
Drucilla Cornell puts it, "having to jump over our own shadow."' 6 4
Recent feminist scholarship on differences between men and
women, however, has far-reaching implications for the modern par163 The ideal of reconciliation highlights another problem with the critical legal studies
movement. CLS literature - from the law review articles to The Lizard - rejects any
notion of conciliation, leaving instead an impression of confrontation. In criticizing the established order, these scholars seem to deny that there is any good in the world: a favorite
deconstructionist exercise is to demonstrate how judicial responses we thought were benevolent were in fact counterproductive. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn.
L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in The Politics of
Law: A Progressive Critique 65 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction
in the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 529 (1977); Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, 1 Marxist Persp. 96
(1978); cf. Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94 Yale L.
J. 209 (1984) (CLS response to the failure of liberalism is nihilism). The radical response to
the existence of the dichotomy-and to the current dominance of individuality-is to disintegrate one's opponents and their viewpoints. The response described here, and ascribed
to a feminine perspective, is to integrate the paradigms. Thus, the injection of a feminine
viewpoint might significantly alter the style, and perhaps the underlying objective, of even
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. Reconciliation seems to be vital: one consequence
of modern failures to reconcile self and community may be the rise of the law and economics
movement. See Heler, The Importance of Normative Decisionmaking- The Limitations of
Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated By the Regulation
of Vacation Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 385, 468-502.
It is not so surprising that even a radical movement excludes the feminine paradigm. Past
radical groups have treated women little better than their liberal or conservative counterparts. See generally H. Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought 126 (1983) (women
within the New Left treated as inferiors, servants, and sexual objects); S. Evans, Personal
Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left
76-87, 111-12, 176-79 (1979) (women viewed in accordance with traditional sex roles in civil
rights projects and Students for a Democratic Society); A. Jaggar & P. Struhl, Feminist
Frameworks 10-11 (1978) (male militants at Columbia attempted to impose domestic tasks
on female militants). CLS appears to be no different. See Johnson, supra note 93, at 281 n.
89 (suggesting CLS is as white-male-dominated as the faculty of Yale Law School); cf.
Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 391 (1984) (in discussing almost two dozen
major figures in CLS, Schlegel mentions one woman, in passing, on the penultimate page of
his article).
'" Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev.
291, 314 (1985).
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adigm and its potential for shadow jumping. The new scholarship
suggests that men and women, by and large, develop strikingly different conceptions of self and thus of the world. The next section
of this article describes what might be called a feminine perspective and suggests that the feminine perspective strongly resembles
the classical paradigm while the masculine perspective strongly resembles the modern paradigm. Although all of us have some mix of
the two paradigms in our own world-view, and some men are more
classical and some women more modern, the classical perspective
may be more dominant in women:
This is not to say that there is a monolithic "women's viewpoint"
any more than there is a monolithic "men's viewpoint." Plainly
there is not. Rather, it is to suggest that women's life experiences
still differ sufficiently from men's that a diverse group of women
would bring a somewhat different set of perceptions and insights
...
than would a similarly diverse group of men.",s
If the modern paradigm is an inevitable result of male domination
of the public sphere, the influx of large numbers of women into
that sphere might radically alter the chances of re-integrating the
classical paradigm or at least change the likely balance of the resolution of the tension between the two paradigms. 6 6
' Wiliams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism,
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 175 n.2 (1982). Williams appears to limit the effect of different
"life experiences" to "certain issues," id., presumably those especially affecting women. For
a refutation of this latter argument, see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
387, 400-01 n.64 (1984) (suggesting that "legal liberalism" is a result of male dominance).
Two of the best modem attempts at reconciling the paradigms are made by women. See
Comell, supra note 164; West, supra note 118. Drucilra Cornell reconciles them under the
theory of "dialogism," and Robin West under the theory of "pragmatic liberalism," but both
represent a conscious attempt to integrate self and community, to achieve, in Cornell's
words, a theory of a "decentered subject, relational at its core . . . [but which] does not
dissolve the self totally in an all-encompassing community." Cornell, supra note 164, at 299.
The men writing in the area tend simply to deconstruct the liberal paradigm or resurrect
the classical paradigm but do not integrate the two. See, e.g., A. MacIntyre, supra note 5; M.
Sandel, supra note 3; R. Unger, supra note 93. But see Shiffrin, supra note 88, at 1111-12,
1192-1215 (synthesizing the two schools under the rubric of "eclectic liberalism"). Many
simply despair of the possibility of reconciliation. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 110, at 1108;
Johnson, supra note 93, at 257; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, supra note 93. It
is delightfully ironic that in the same article in which Brest expresses pessimism that this
fundamental tension between self and other can ever be resolved, he also asks, in the context of identifying judges as their law clerks' "adopted fathers," "[w]ho knows how our
world might appear if one could honestly add 'or mothers'?" Brest, supra note 110, at 1106
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WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVE: RECAPTURING THE JEFFERSONIAN
MOMENT

A.

Introduction

New studies in a variety of academic disciplines suggest that
women in fact may have a unique perspective, a world-view that
differs in significant respects from that of men. Feminist scholars
in such diverse fields as philosophy, history, sociology, art, and anthropology have identified peculiarly feminine perspectives in
those disciplines. 8 7 Recent work in psychology and in literary theory is particularly illuminating. Psychological studies suggest that
women's moral development and concept of self may differ from
those of men. Feminist literary theory suggests that women's writing differs from men's in ways that reflect a radically different perspective. Despite the independence of the research and the differences in both topics of investigation and terms of description, the
feminine perspective identified in each of these fields is, at its core,
a single, common approach. That approach is captured in the tension between women's primary concern with intimacy or connection and men's primary focus on separation or autonomy.""'
n.230. Perhaps he would not be so certain the tension is unresolvable if "or mothers" could
honestly be added.
167 See R. Morgan, The Anatomy of Freedom: Feminism, Physics and Global Politics
(1982); N. Noddings, supra note 19; E. Showalter, A Literature of Their Own (1977); P.
Spacks, The Female Imagination (1975); Blecki, Feminist Literary Criticism: An Introduction, in Feminist Literary Criticism: A Symposium 1 (K. Bordan & F. Rinn eds. 1974); Harding & Hintikka, Introduction, in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science ix (S. Harding & M. Hintikka
eds. 1983); O'Brien, Feminist Theory and Dialectical Logic, in Feminist Theory: A Critique
of Ideology 99 (N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, & B. Gelpi eds. 1982); Garfunkel, The Improvised
Self: Sex Differences in Artistic Identity (Dissertation, Dep't of Psych. & Soc. Rel., Harv.
Univ., 1984); Goodman, Women's Studies: The Debate Continues, N.Y. Times Magazine,
Apr. 22, 1984, at 39; Kolbert, Scientifc Ideas: Women's vs. Men's, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985,
at C1, col. 1; Goleman, Psychology Is Revising Its View of Women, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1984, at C1, col. 1.
188 The most persuasive explanation for the differences between men and women is based
on differences between boys' and girls' development of an ego or sense of self. Ego development occurs while the child is still quite young and is therefore significantly influenced by
the child's primary caretaker. Because, in general, girls are raised by a primary caretaker of
the same gender and boys are raised by a primary caretaker of the opposite gender, girls
reaffirm their early attachments while boys repudiate them. Thus, women come to see
themselves as fundamentally connected and men see themselves as fundamentally detached.
See N. Chodorow, supra note 162, at 166-68; C. Gilligan, supra note 162, at 5-23. Other
explanations for the differences between men and women include the socialization process,
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This difference between men and women may influence the
manner in which they think about, write about, and practice their
disciplines. Thus, it is probable that women's unique perspective
on law and jurisprudence, as a function of their different worldview, extends well beyond areas traditionally seen as affecting
women, 169 and in fact encompasses all legal issues. Just as women's
writing on all subjects-not just on intimacy, domesticity, or
women's place in society-reflects a different cast, women's views
on the law in general may provide insights and approaches that are
less natural to, and therefore less available to, male lawyers and
judges.
This different approach to the law makes women a potentially
innovative force in the legal community. Because women have been
excluded from the mainstream of legal authority and legal change,
the legal system, like moral, political, and philosophical discourse,
has become "a set of cultural and symbolic forms that view human
experience from the distorted and one-sided perspective of a single
gender." 170 This is not to suggest merely that the legal structure
the mother's varying reaction to sons and daughters, and biological differences. See, e.g., E.
Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (1968); E. Janeway, Man's World, Woman's Place: A
Study in Social Mythology (1971); J. Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976);
Flax, The Conflict Between Nurturance and Autonomy in Mother-Daughter Relationships
and Within Feminism, Fern. Stud., June 1978, at 171.
1ll It long has been recognized that women may make unique contributions to specific
areas of law because personal experience in those areas gives them a distinct perspective on
the legal rules and underlying policy considerations. Until recently, female educators and
practitioners alike generally have been channeled into a few limited areas of law, primarily
areas such as family law, trusts and estates, and discrimination law. See, e.g., Fossum,
Women Law Professors, 1980 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 903, 911-13; White, Women in
the Law, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1051, 1063 (1967). One limitation of the view that women make
"unique contributions" to certain areas of the law is that it relies on the premise that one
cannot fully understand an aspect of the law unless one has personally experienced it. Thus,
only members of minority groups can teach discrimination law, only women can teach rape
law, and so on. If this is followed through to its logical conclusion, all law teachers will
ultimately become specialists in unalterable areas, depending not only on gender but also on
ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds. For example, black students at Harvard Law
School boycotted a course on race discrimination because it was taught by Jack Greenberg,
a white lawyer with extensive civil rights litigation experience. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1982,
at A9, col. 1. This is socially unwise, educationally unsound, and may well be constitutionally defective.
171 O'Brien, supra note 167, at 99. As early as 1946, Justice Douglas noted that:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of
one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence
one on the other is among the imponderables .... [A] flavor, a distinct quality is
lost if either sex is excluded.
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ignores or minimizes significant gender differences,1 71 but rather
that because women have been excluded from shaping our legal
structure in general, that structure reflects a distorted view of the
tension between autonomy and connection and between the individual and society.
What sort of distortion has the masculine paradigm introduced
into our legal system? Feminist scholars identify three primary dichotomies between men's and women's thinking: while women emphasize connection, subjectivity, and responsibility, men emphasize
autonomy, objectivity, and rights. Although the parallels between
the feminine perspective and classical paradigm, or between the
masculine perspective and modern paradigm, are not precisely congruent, the similarities are too strong to ignore.
Recall the introductory description of the characteristic differences between the classical and modern paradigms. The contrast
between women's emphasis on connections among individuals, and
men's on individual autonomy, is almost exactly parallel to that
between classical holism and modern atomism. Women's preference for a subjective approach, and men's for an objective approach, recall the dichotomy between contextuality and abstraction. Finally, the male emphasis on rights matches the modern
paradigm's reliance on an abstract, rule-based method for mediating between competing interests in a pluralist society; the feminine
ethic of caring and responsibility suggests instead the classical tendency to define human existence in terms of relationships to others
and to favor contextual societal values and individual virtues. The
remainder of this section explores these similarities in detail.
A brief caveat is in order. First, I am not contending that gender-based differences are universal, only that they are likely
enough that the historical exclusion of women from the shaping of
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
171

The Supreme Court's treatment of pregnancy-based classifications illustrates the ten-

dency to treat women as if they were men. See General Elec. Co. v. Gibert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); see also Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex
Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 Or. L. Rev. 265,
280-84, 301-04 (1984) (discussing the Supreme Court's inability to view reproductive freedom cases as essentially sexual discrimination cases). It is equally fallacious, however, to
assume that legal recognition of gender differences is the solution. Doctrinal recognition of
generalized gender differences is dangerous because it both perpetuates those differences
and adopts an unfairly universal approach to a contextual problem. See Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 968 (1984); Wildman, supra.
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the legal system has had a profound impact, which cannot be reversed-or, to a large extent, even recognized-until women begin
to participate in that enterprise. Second, I am not limiting my
analysis to a feminist perspective: feminists have a particular political agenda that may or may not be shared by all women (and is
shared by some men). Rather, this is an analysis of a feminine perspective that encompasses aspects of personality and relationship
to the world that have nothing to do with one's political preferences. 172 Finally, I am not suggesting that the feminine perspective
17'For examples of authors suggesting the existence of a feminist perspective rather than
a feminine perspective, see, e.g., H. Eisenstein, supra note 163 (alternates between the two);
J. Elshtain, supra note 19, at 221 (discussing the political prescriptions of radical feminist
discourse); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward A Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 Signs: J. Women in Culture & Soc'y 635 (1983) (describing the liberal state
as the embodiment of male interest and, suggesting a feminist theory of state); Polan, Toward A Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in The Politics of Law- A Progressive Critique 294
(D. Kairys ed. 1982) (suggesting a marxist-feminist approach to law).
The few legal scholars who have suggested the existence of a feminine jurisprudence fall
into three categories. First, a number of authors have made the suggestion, with little or no
elaboration on the potential content or effect of a feminine jurisprudence. See, e.g., Fox,
Goodbye to Gameplaying, Juris Dr., Jan. 1978, at 37; Pearson & Sachs, Barristers and Gentlemen: A Critical Look at Sexism in the Legal Profession, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 400, 413 (1980);
Williams, supra note 165, at 175 n.2. Second, there are those who believe that a feminine
perspective is either derived from, or useful for, resolving "women's issues." See, e.g., Cole,
Strategies of Difference: Litigating For Women's Rights In a Man's World, 2 J.L. & Inequality 33, 51-52 (1984); DuBois, supra note 123, at 13-15 (Dunlap); Freedman, Sex Equality,
Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913, 965-68 (1983); cf. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 Duke L.J. 447, 460-61, 480, 485 (a feminine perspective can be
used for this and more). This argument suffers from an overly narrow focus. See supra note
169. In particular, a focus on women's perspective as "the voice of the victim" suggests that
the perspective is limited merely to remedying gender inequality (broadly conceived). See,
e.g., DuBois, supra note 123, at 27-74 (MacKinnon).
Third, two authors have attempted the project I address in the text, but with a more
limited scope. Carrie Menkel-Meadow has sketched out the difference a women's perspective makes in pedagogical technique and in the procedural form of the legal system, but she
has not extended the analysis to jurisprudential matters. See DuBois, supra note 123, at 5059 (Menkel-Meadow); Menkel-Meadow, Portia, In a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, Women
in Law?: A Review of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Women in Law, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 189, 192. Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward the Feminization of
Legal Education, in Humanistic Education in Law Essays on the Application of a Humanistic Perspective to Law Teaching, Monograph III at 16 (1981) (Project for the Study and
Application of Humanistic Education in Law: Columbia Univ. School of Law).
Kenneth Karst also has described potential feminine innovations in constitutional law but
has limited himself to innovations "within the range of permissible judicial interpretation of
the Constitution as we know it." Karst, supra, at 480. His article also focuses only on differences in moral perception, rather than on the wholly different paradigm I am suggesting
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is any better than the masculine perspective, just that it is different. The incorporation of a new perspective need not imply a hierarchical ranking; I am arguing merely that the law has been distorted by its one-sided focus and that the feminine perspective
described here represents a move toward correcting that distortion.17 3 In particular, the feminine perspective is a natural reflection of the classical paradigm, and its integration is likely to remove the particular distortions of modern liberalism.
B. Connection and Automomy
Like the classical paradigm, the feminine perspective views individuals primarily as interconnected members of a community.
Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan, in groundbreaking studies on
the development of self and morality, have concluded that women
tend to have a more intersubjective sense of self than men and
that the feminine perspective is therefore more other-directed. 17 4
Other studies tend to confirm this finding. 7 5 The essential difference between the male and female perspectives mirrors the fundamental difference between the modern and classical paradigms:
"[t]he basic feminine sense of self is connected to the world, the

here. A more fundamental problem with Karst's analysis is that he seems to equate the
feminine paradigm with liberal (or perhaps somewhat radical) political ideology. See, e.g.,
id. at 495 & n.185. In doing so, he defeats his own purpose, for he all but suggests that the
feminine paradigm was operating (albeit unconsciously) in the Warren era. See, e.g., id. at
497-99; DuBois, supra note 123, at 14-15, 69 (Dunlap, DuBois). Finally, Karst is correct to
disclaim the ability of a male to explore a feminine paradigm, see, e.g., Karst, supra, at 44748; his own masculine emphasis on autonomy manifests itself sporadically throughout the
article. See, e.g., id. at 477 (identifying the dilemmas of autonomy, but assuming that autonomy is something to strive for despite its dilemmas); id. at 479 (describing autonomy as
"threatening" to women, rather than as unnecessary or simply outside their emotional ken).
173 As Carol Gilligan notes, the discourse about the two perspectives in the context of
jurisprudence "is no longer either simply about justice or simply about caring, it is about
bringing them together to transform the domain." DuBois, supra note 123, at 45; see id. at
60-61 (Gilligan).
1'See N. Chodorow, supra note 162; C. Gilligan, supra note 162. See also DuBois, supra
note 123, at 47-48 (Gilligan) (in one study, five percent of men and 60% of women tended to
focus on the feminine rather than the masculine perspective).
175 For example, even at a very young age, female children tend to be more dependent on
and reluctant to leave their mothers. See Goldberg & Lewis, Play Behavior in the Year-Old
Infant: Early Sex Difference, 40 Child Dev.21 (1969); Messer & Lewis, Social Class and Sex
Differences in the Attachment and Play Behavior of the Year-Old Infant, 18 Merrill-Palmer
Q. Behav. & Dev.295 (1972).
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basic masculine sense of self is separate.' 1 76 Women thus tend to
see others as extensions of themselves rather than as outsiders or
17
competitors. 7
Gilligan suggests that Kohlberg's description of a morally mature person-a "rational individual aware of values and rights
prior to social contracts" who adopts "universal principles of justice," including "respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons" 7 8-- instead describes a masculine morality. 79 That
masculine perspective embodies the individualism inherent in the
modern paradigm. The parallel between the classical paradigm and
feminine morality, by contrast, is clearly illustrated by Gilligan's
quotation of a typical female response to a moral dilemma:
By yourself, there is little sense to things. It is like the sound of
one hand clapping, the sound of one man or one woman, there is
something lacking. It is the collective that is important to me, and
that collective is based on certain guiding principles, one of which
is that everybody belongs to it, and that you all come from it. You
have to love someone else, because while you may not like them,
you are inseparable from them. In a way, it is like loving your right
hand. They are part of you; that other person is part of that giant
collection of people that you are connected to. 80
Women's emphasis on connection also suggests that the cliche
that women are more cooperative and less competitive than men
may have some basis in fact. Historically, women have tended to
176 N. Chodorow, supra note 162, at 169; see Chodorow, Family Structure and Feminine
Personality, in Woman, Culture and Society 43, 44 (M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere eds. 1974)
(feminine personality defines itself in relation and connection to other people more than
does masculine personality); Douvan, New Sources of Conflict in Females at Adolescence
and Early Adulthood, in Feminine Personality and Conflict 31, 38 (1970); Garai &
Scheinfeld, Sex Differences in Mental and Behavioral Traits, 77 Genetic Psych. Monographs
169, 270 (1968); C. Gilligan, supra note 162, at 8 ("femininity is defined through attachment"). But see E. Maccoby & C. Jacklin, The Psychology of Sex Differences 142-50 (1974).
177 Psychologists use the term "fluid ego boundaries" to suggest what I am calling an
intersubjective sense of self. For theories that women's ego boundaries are more fluid (and
thus that their conceptions of self are more intersubjective), see N. Chodorow, supra note
162, at 67-99, 169; J. Miller, supra note 168, at 71-73; Carlson, Sex Differences in Ego Functioning Exploratory Studies of Agency and Communion, 37 J. Consulting & Clinical Psych.
267, 270-71 (1971); Gutmann, Women and the Conception of Ego Strength, 11 MerrillPalmer Q. Behav. & Dev. 229 (1965); Scheman, supra note 8, at 238-39.
17' Kohlberg, supra note 154, at 34-35 (describing the post-conventional level).
179 See C. Gilligan, supra note 162, at 18-22.
' Id. at 160 (some emphasis in original, some added).

HeinOnline -- 72 Va. L. Rev. 585 1986

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 72:543

achieve their goals communally; from quilting bees to consciousness-raising sessions, women have banded together rather than
striving individually.' 8 1 There are analogous differences between
the organization and ideology underlying women's traditional dominion, the family, and men's traditional arena, the marketplace:
as Frances Olsen notes, the market is based on an individualist
82
ethic and the family on an altruistic ethic.1
Some of the most intriguing evidence of a feminine perspective
comes from the field of literary criticism, where feminist critics are
discovering characteristic differences in both style and substance
between male and female authors. In seeking to identify this
"uniquely female literary consciousness, 83s they are discovering
indications of a similar tension between autonomy and connection.
Male writers typically portray individuals as existing prior to and
divorced from society. The male metaphor, and the male travail, is
individualist18 4 In contrast, women writers are less apt to focus on
purely individual heroism. Unlike the archtypal masculine "coming
of age" novel, the developing feminine counterpart describes
women's maturation in the context of a group of women, the definition of one "self" from among many "selves":
For the woman writer, "the group" is a kind of interior quest, a
portrait of the artist as several different young selves-contrasting,
181 See, e.g., N. Auerbach, Communities of Women: An Idea in Fiction (1978); S. Evans,
supra note 163, at 214-15 (small groups became the primary structure of women's liberation); G. Lerner, The Majority Finds Its Past' Placing Women in History 43, 121 (1979);
Heilbrun, A Response To Writing and Sexual Difference, in Writing and Sexual Difference
291, 292 (E.Abel ed. 1982). Women's preference for cooperation over competition may explain early findings that women feared success. Sassen, Success Anxiety in Women: A Constructivist Interpretation of Its Source and Significance, 50 Harv. Educ. Rev. 13 (1980).
182Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 1497, 1505 (1983); see also M. Sandel, supra note 3, at 33 (family life governed by
the principle of justice differs in kind from family life governed by spontaneous affection).
The universality of separate spheres for men and women is reflected in the distinction between the public political world and the private world of household or family made in all
but the simplest society. See J. Elshtain, supra note 19, at 6, 14.
181 Showalter, Introduction, in The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory 6 (E. Showalter ed. 1985); see Showalter, Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness in The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory 243 (E.
Showalter ed. 1985).
18,See S. Gilbert & S. Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the
Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination 67 (1979); Baym, Melodramas of Beset Manhood:
How Theories of American Fiction Exclude Women Authors, in The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on Women, Literature, and Theory 63, 71 (E. Showalter ed. 1985).
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perhaps warring, images that are ghosts of her adult destiny. She
exorcises them by giving each self her own life. The group portrait
thus releases the "other" woman within the mature writer-all
those women she chose not to be when she grew up. 185
Feminist literary critics are also beginning to identify some characteristically feminine styles, which also suggest an intersubjective
perspective. For example, women writers more frequently use a
technique of rotating a novel's perspective from one character to
another.'8 6 This technique is often criticized by male critics,8 7 and
it may be that women authors are more receptive to the technique
because they are better able to perceive not only the relations
among characters but also those between themselves and the characters they create. They almost literally "become" their characters
(male and female) for the same reason that their intersubjective
perspective keeps them from fully separating themselves from
others. Males, on the other hand, with their emphasis on autonomy, see the technique as a violation of the ideal of separation.
C. Contextuality and Abstraction
Scholarship in literature and psychology also suggests that
women are more contextual and men more abstract. Piaget, for example, found that girls playing children's games tend to treat the
rules of the game as less fixed and more flexible than do boys and
that girls are more likely to stop a game altogether-thus preserving friendships-if a dispute arises. For boys, development and application of fixed, abstract rules is almost as important as the object of the game itself. 8 8 Again, Kohlberg's description of moral
development (i.e., the development of the masculine perspective)
stresses a progression from context-bound judgments to abstract
moral principles.8 9 Women, on the other hand, in responding to
moral dilemmas, tend instead to look to circumstances rather than
to abstractions: the right moral response depends on the context. 190
Gould, Life After Radcliffe, N.Y. Times Book Review, Sept. 23, 1984, at 9.
199 See, e.g., Mellown, Character and Themes in the Novels of Jean Rhys, in Contemporary Women Novelists: A Collection of Critical Essays 118, 130 (P. Spacks ed. 1977).
287 Id.
168 See J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment of The Child 82 (1965); see also Lever, Sex Differences in the Games Children Play, 23 Social Probs. 478 (1976) (similar findings).
18, See Kohlberg, supra note 154.
190 See C. Gilligan, supra note 162, at 38.
135
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This concept of feminine reliance on context is borne out in
some empirical experiments. For example, the greater familiarity
of even young boys with universal principles is well illustrated by a
simple experiment in which boys and girls were shown pictures of
everyday objects and asked to group related objects:
[B]oys tend to bracket together objects (or pictures of objects)
whose intrinsic characteristics are similar, whereas girls weight
more heavily the functional and relational characteristics of the entities to be compared. For instance, boys frequently bracketed together such entities as a truck, a car, and an ambulance, while girls
bracketed such entities as a doctor, a hospital bed, and an
ambulance. 191
The boys focused on the abstraction of "locomotion," seeing the
objects as independent units, while the girls emphasized instead
the concrete relationships among objects. 19 2 Other studies confirm
that males of all ages are better able to separate discrete objects
from their backgrounds and relationships than are females. Males
are said to be less field-dependent; that is, they have a greater
"ability to overcome the influence of an embedding context."'9 3
Moreover, current controversies in philosophy tend to break
down along gender lines. Despite exceptions, male philosophers
often endorse more abstract and less contextual theories. For example, mainstream discussions of virtue tend to assume that virtues are abstract qualities. Committing murder under dangerous
circumstances, though a criminal act, may still constitute an instance of the virtue of courage. Philippa Foot, on the other hand,
suggests that virtues are contextual, not abstract: the virtue of
courage is exhibited only under circumstances where the act itself
1
can be considered courageous. 11
Some of the most sophisticated attempts to develop "concrete
universals"-a notion of essences (teloi) located in space and
191 Hintikka & Hintikka, How Can Language Be Sexist? in Discovering Reality. Feminist
Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science 139,
145 (S. Harding & M. Hintikka eds. 1983) (footnote omitted).
"I Id. at 145-46; see Maccoby, Sex Differences in Intellectual Functioning, in The Development of Sex Differences 25-55 (E. Maccoby ed. 1966).
19"J. Sherman, On the Psychology of Women: A Survey of Empirical Studies 21 (1971);
see Witkin & Goodenough, Field Dependence and Interpersonal Behavior, 84 Psychological
Bull. 661, 662 (1977) (explaining concept of field dependence).
I" See P. Foot, supra note 147, at 15-17.
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time195 and thus reconciling context with the notion of a human
telos-have been written by women.19 6 Iris Murdoch, for example,
deplores the loss of a human telos, but denies that her (or anyone's) moral theories can be used "as a formula which can be illuminatingly introduced into any and every moral act.' 97 She explicitly argues that moral concepts are necessarily "concrete
universals."' 9 8 That women are disproportionately represented
among modern philosophers seeking both a contextual and a teleological moral theory suggests that, for whatever reason, the reconciliation of the modern and classical paradigms is more natural to
women.
Literary criticism also recognizes the difference between the abstraction of men and the concreteness of women. One critic has
suggested, for example, that George Eliot's Mill on the Floss illustrates the tension between the male notion of universal maxims
and the female unwillingness to differentiate the universal from its
particular applications. 99 Women's writing has also been charac"' See Gould, The Woman Question:

Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Phi-

losophy, in Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation 5 (C. Gould & M.
Wartofsky eds. 1976). Gould defines the concept of concrete universality by contrasting it
with abstract universality. Within the abstract conception, universals are only those things
common to all humans and so are fixed and unchanging. Id. at 9, 27. The concrete universal,
by contrast, is the totality or all common and all different characteristics of a class. Id. at
26. The concrete universal, therefore, is not a fixed essence, but "develops in time ... [and
is] concretely located in history and society." Id. at 27.
I" Philippa Foot attempts to construct a contextual theory of virtue. See P. Foot, supra
note 147. Iris Murdoch rejects the modem concept of identity as dependent upon impersonal reality, and tries to construct a contextually teleological moral theory based on morality as "an individual... making a specialized personal use of a concept." I. Murdoch, supra
note 147, at 25. Robin West describes "pragmatic liberalism" as essentially requiring a contextual teleology: pragmatic liberalism is "committed to a naturalisticand evolving conception of the good life," as opposed to either a "moralistic and static" conception or "indiscriminate preference maximization." West, supra note 118, at 674, 682. Drucilla Cornell
attempts to revive the Hegelian concept of "geist" to reconcile universality and context.
Cornell, supra note 164, at 359-372. Whether these attempts are characterized as revivals or
as reformations of the classical paradigm, they all reject the modem paradigm.
197 . Murdoch, supra note 147, at 42-43; see Gould, supra note 195, at 5 (describing the
philosophic approach of concrete universality and suggesting that it can be used to analyze
the position of women).
lBS I. Murdoch, supra note 147, at 29.
Jacobus, The Question of Language: Men of Maxims and The Mill on the Floss, in
Writing and Sexual Difference 37, 42 (E. Abel ed. 1982). Jacobus contrasts Eliot's remark, in
her novel, that "the man of maxims is the popular representative of the minds that are
guided in their moral judgment solely by general rules," with the view of the central character, Maggie Tulliver--" 'to lace ourselves up in formulas is to ignore the special circum-
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terized (and criticized) as less linear and unified and more fluid
than men's; 200 this again suggests a focus on context rather than on
abstract rules of progression. Even feminine literary criticism is
more contextual: Elaine Showalter has suggested that one characteristic of feminist criticism is the rejection of (masculine) objective, non-experiential critical theories.2 0 1
D.

Responsibility and Rights

Until recently, the archetypal developmental continuum of individual moral sensibility was believed to be an orderly progression
from self-centeredness through other-centeredness to the development of logical, independent, universal principles-rights-that
depend neither on one's own needs nor on what others believe is
right. 0 2 Although this progression mirrors male moral development, it fails to reflect the moral growth pattern of women.0 3
Gender-based differences in moral structure, long seen as evidence of women's moral immaturity,2 0 4 may in fact be evidence of
a feminine morality that differs in its emphasis from that of males.
In her study of moral development, Carol Gilligan found that
women tend to view a moral problem as "a problem of care and
responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and
rules. ' 20 5 When faced with the moral dilemma of whether a man
should steal a drug he cannot afford to save his dying wife, Gilligan
found that, while men struggle with the conflicting rights of the
parties, women focus on the druggist's "moral obligation to show
compassion, ' 206 "not on the conflict of rights but on the failure of
response. 2 07 Although men and women may agree that the man
ought to steal the drug, men justify it in terms of a resolution bestances that mark the individual lot."' Id. (quoting G. Eliot, Mill on the Floss 628 (A. Byatt
ed. 1979)).
200 Gardiner, On Female Identity and Writing By Women, in Writing and Sexual Difference 177, 185 (E. Abel ed. 1982); Jacobus, supra note 199, at 39-40.
201 Showalter, Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness, supra note 183, at 244.
202 See L. Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (1981); Kohlberg, supra note
154.
203 See C. Gilligan, supra note 162, at 18-22.
204 See L. Kohlberg, supra note 202; N. Noddings, supra note 19, at 42; J. Sherman, supra
note 193, at 101-02.
2o

C. Gilligan, supra note 162, at 73.

2

Id. at 54 (quoting a subject of Gilligan's study).
Id.

207
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tween conflicting rights of husband and druggist, and women in
terms of the need for more compassion by the druggist in the face
of the husband's compassion for his wife.2 08 Whether personal or
political, 09 the moral structure of "mature" males reflects a paradigm of independent rights, while that of females emphasizes relational responsibilities.
Gilligan's work suggests that moral development from the conventional level may take either of two directions: progression toward a contextual moral theory (expanding on Aristotelian notions
of what is right or good but placing human teloi in context) or
progression toward an abstract moral theory (emphasizing rights as
a form of trump). Recognition of alternative routes of moral development may shed new light on the failure of Jeffersonian republicanism and the ultimate triumph of liberalism. The classical paradigm, especially in its republican form, may be an example of the
conventional level on the verge of its masculine successor. The republican vision represented an incomplete or immature ideology,
but its maturation might have taken either of two paths: development of a mature virtue-based ideology or rejection of virtue in
favor of rights. The former reflects a feminine vision, the latter a
masculine perspective. Because the feminine paradigm has been
conspiciously absent from the shaping of moral or political traditions, the development of the nation's ideology has paralleled individual moral development in the male pattern, not the female
pattern.1 0
208 See, e.g., id. at 29.
209

The two types of morality-personal and political-are intimately connected: "every

moral vision is ultimately and irreducibly a political vision: a vision (or understanding or
experience) of the world and of our place, as fundamentally social beings, in that world."
Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1137,
1149 (1984).

210 Anthony Kronman has described an analogous bifurcated path out of the Hobbesian
state of nature. He suggests that parties in a state of nature, wishing to enter into contracts
that neither they nor any third party has the pure strength to enforce, must develop mechanisms to provide security of performance. Three of his potential mechanisms presume that
the parties' interests are unalterably opposed to one another and thus rely on such hostile
devices as taking hostages. These mechanisms are quintessentially masculine. The final
mechanism he describes as "union": the parties "reduce the risk of opportunism by taking
steps to increase the likelihood that each will see his own self-interest as being internally
connected to the welfare of the other." This last mechanism is fundamentally feminine.
Although Kronman suggests that all four mechanisms still survive in our post-nature law of
contracts, the very numerical imbalance between masculine and feminine mechanisms imus-
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TOWARD A FEMININE JURISPRUDENCE: THE FEMININE

PERSPECTIVE OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR

The preceding argument suggests that the Constitution, especially in light of subsequent interpretations in the liberal tradition,
is a quintessentially masculine document. Calls for a more classical
interpretation are unlikely to succeed as long as the interpreters
are exclusively male. But the interepreters are no longer exclusively male. Justice O'Connor's four years on the Supreme Court
provide an excellent opportunity to test the thesis that a feminine
perspective might result in a feminine jurisprudence and to sketch
the contours of one version of that jurisprudence. If the thesis is
correct, O'Connor's jurisprudence should differ in characteristically
feminine or classical ways from the jurisprudence of her brethren.
The remainder of this article will explore the feminine aspects of
her jurisprudence. In particular, it will focus on differences between Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist: because they are otherwise ideologically similar, and because they so often vote together, 211 their disagreements are significant. This pattern of
disagreement is highly suggestive of the operation of a uniquely
feminine perspective. 12
A.

Community Values

Despite the fundamental dichotomy between a jurisprudence of
rights and a jurisprudence of community, there is one type of case
in which the two will intersect to yield the same result. Both individualists and communitarians may be expected to protest infringement of individual rights that protect against diminution of
trates the prevalence of the masculine paradigm. See Kronman, Contract Law and the State
of Nature, 1 J.L. Econ & Organization 5 (1985).
"I During the 1981 term, O'Connor and Rehnquist voted together in 81.6% of the Court's
full-opinion decisions; in 1982-1983 they voted together in 85.7% of the Court's full-opinion
decisions; and in 1983-1984 they voted together in 91.9% of the Court's full-opinion decisions. In the 1981 and 1983 terms, only Brennan and Marshall voted together more often,
and in the 1982 term no two justices did so. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 62, 305 (1982); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 296 (1983); The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 87, 308 (1984).
212 This data cannot be quantified or proven scientifically and is thus open to criticism
that it is possible to find indications of a feminine perspective in the writings of any Justice.
These indications are, however, so prevalent in O'Connor's jurisprudence, and so characteristic of her disagreements with her brethren, that I doubt whether an analysis of any other
Justice's work would yield such a consistently suggestive pattern.
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or exclusion from community membership. Two issues frequently
before the Supreme Court exhibit this intersection. In establishment clause cases, government endorsement of religion might be
deemed to devalue the community status of non-believers. In discrimination cases, a demand for equal treatment can be viewed as
a demand to be treated as an equal member of the community.
The common thread in these cases is that the rights at issue belong
to individuals as members of communities rather than as autonomous units. While most constitutional and statutory rights protect
the individual against the community, anti-establishment and
anti-discrimination values safeguard the individual's right to belong to the community. It is therefore highly suggestive that
O'Connor frequently disagrees with Rehnquist (and often with
Chief Justice Burger as well) in such cases.
1.

Establishment Clause Cases

In three major establishment clause cases, Justice O'Connor
joined the majority in striking down state statutes while Justice
Rehnquist dissented.2 13 In several other cases, the two justices disagreed at least in part. 14 This pattern of disagreement suggests
that O'Connor does not fully share Rehnquist's hostility to individual rights. O'Connor's explanation of her position on the establishment clause is not, however, fully congruent with established liberal doctrine on the protection of individual rights. She relies
instead on a strikingly unique vision of-the harms that the establishment clause is intended to prevent. That vision fits the feminine paradigm to the extent that it derives its force from a preference for notions of community over notions of individual rights.
213 See Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479

(1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
" See Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (both justices dissent from majority invalidation of parochial school aid program, but on different grounds); Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (majority invalidates two programs providing public aid
to parochial schools: Rehnquist would uphold both programs, but O'Connor only one);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (both join majority in upholding public display of
creche, but O'Connor concurs separately to "clarify" her view of the appropriate test); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (majority invalidates reporting regulations applicable to
some religious organizations but not others: neither O'Connor nor Rehnquist would grant
standing, but only Rehnquist joins White's dissent on the merits).
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Justice O'Connor first described her own views of the establishment clause in Lynch v. Donnelly. 15 In that case, the Court upheld, against an establishment clause challenge, the inclusion of a
creche in a municipality's annual Christmas display. Justice
O'Connor joined the majority opinion but also wrote separately "to
suggest a clarification of [the Court's] Establishment Clause doctrine." 2 18 She read the precedents to establish a rule forbidding
"government endorsement or disapproval of religion. ' ' 2 Her explanation for that rule reveals her reliance on the values of community rather than individual rights: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political com2 18
munity. Disapproval sends the opposite message.
This theory came to fruition a year later in Wallace v. Jaffree21 9
In Lynch, O'Connor had found no message of exclusion from community in the decision to erect a creche. In Wallace, she found
that Alabama's school prayer statute did communicate such a message. She therefore joined the "liberal" majority in voting, over
strong dissents by Burger, White, and Rehnquist, to invalidate the
statute. She did not, however, join Stevens' majority opinion,
which held that, under the three-prong test developed in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,2 the statute was fatally flawed by its religious purpose. She relied instead on the test she had fashioned in Lynch. In
light of the controversy surrounding the statute's enactment, she
held that an "objective observer" would necessarily conclude that
both the intended and received message of the statute was endorsement of religious activity. Elaborating on the importance of
community membership, O'Connor suggested that diminution of
that membership, as well as exclusion from the community, violates the establishment clause: "the religious liberty protected by
the Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes
adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the politi215 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
"' Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.at 688
218 Id.
219 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
220 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
217
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cal community." '2 1
A theory that characterizes the evil of government endorsement
of religion as a detriment to one's membership in the community,
rather than as a violation of one's individual rights, goes a long
way toward explaining the pattern of disagreement between
O'Connor and her fellow conservatives. Although she often joins
the conservative contingent in denying protection to ordinary individual rights-those that inhere solely in the individual-she is
less willing to permit violations of what might be termed intersubjective individual rights. Government endorsement of religion deprives individuals of what O'Connor views as a value qualitatively
different from most ordinary individual rights: full membership in
the community. This very anomalous sort of right derives its force
not from the independence of individuals but from their mutual
interdependence.
2. DiscriminationCases
Although it is not surprising that Justice O'Connor is more receptive to claims of gender discrimination than is Justice Rehnquist,22 2 it is more difficult to explain her greater willingness to
remedy the effects of race discrimination and discrimination
against aliens.223 Moreover, in several cases that defy easy charac22 Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

"'

See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (O'Connor finds

paying lower retirement benefits to women violates Title VII; Rehnquist does not); Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (O'Connor finds failure to
cover medical expenses of employees' pregnant spouses, when all other medical costs of
spouses are covered, violates Title VII; Rehnquist does not); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (O'Connor finds exclusion of men from state nursing school
violates equal protection clause; Rehnquist does not); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512 (1982) (O'Connor finds employment discrimination within the scope of Title IX's
prohibition against gender discrimination by institutions receiving federal funds; Rehnquist
does not); Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (both agree with majority that filing charges
with the EEOC is an equitable, not a jurisdictional, prerequisite to bringing a suit under
Title VII, but only Burger and Rehnquist join Powell's separate concurrence to stress the
necessity of timely charges for any award of retroactive seniority). But see Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (both agree that Title IX is limited to narrow program
receiving federal funds); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (both agree that, in a
gender discrimination case under Title VII, an offer of reinstatement, even without an offer
of retroactive seniority, tolls an employer's backpay liability).
123 On race discrimination, see, e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984) (in case limiting scope of affirmative action in employment, O'Connor writes
separately to stress the narrowness of the Court's holding); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
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terization, the difference between her position and that of Justice
Rehnquist seems to lie in her reluctance to accept conduct that
condemns groups or individuals to outsider status. Although her
reasoning in this area is less clearly articulated than in her establishment clause jurisprudence, an examination of several cases illustrates the underlying framework of an emphasis on community.
That framework indicates that her greater sympathy for the victims of race or alienage discrimination is part of a consistent pattern of protection of the value of full membership in communities.
Two companion cases involving apportionment illustrate Justice
O'Connor's views on discrimination. Apportionment cases involve
one of the most fundamental aspects of community membership,
the right to participate in the shaping of the community's values
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (under Title VI, O'Connor would allow greater relief to victims
of discrimination than would Rehnquist; she also notes that she might construe Title VI to
prohibit non-intentional discrimination were the issue not foreclosed by precedent); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (O'Connor joins majority upholding IRS
regulation making discriminatory schools ineligible for tax-exempt status; Rehnquist dissents); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (O'Connor finds "stop-and-identify" statute
unconstitutionally vague, noting danger of discriminatory enforcement against particular
groups; Rehnquist dissents); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
(O'Connor joins majority finding NAACP-sponsored boycott of white merchants protected
by first amendment and therefore not subject to action for damages; Rehnquist concurs in
result only, without opinion); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (O'Connor joins majority
affirming district court's finding that at-large election district maintained for racially discriminatory purpose; Rehnquist dissents); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255 (1982)
(O'Connor finds that state court asked to implement change in state voting laws must first
determine whether pre-clearance by attorney general is necessary under Voting Rights Act;
Rehnquist finds that state courts have no role in enforcing the Voting Rights Act); Blanding
v. DuBose, 454 U.S. 393 (1982) (O'Connor joins per curiam opinion construing Voting
Rights Act to require perfect compliance with detailed procedures; Rehnquist concurs, but
writes separately to lament the "unreasonably burdensome and unrealistic control" over
state and local governments given to the federal government under the Act.); Canaday v.
Lumberton City Bd. of Educ., 454 U.S. 957 (1981) (O'Connor joins majority in granting
injunction against annexation pending Voting Rights Act clearance; Rehnquist dissents);
Board of Educ. v. Davis, 454 U.S. 904 (1981) (Court denies certiorari in school desegregation
case; Rehnquist dissents).
On discrimination against aliens, see, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)
(O'Connor holds that employer commits unfair labor practice by reporting illegal alien to
INS in retaliation for participation in union activities; Rehnquist dissents on ground that
illegal aliens are not "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA); Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216 (1984) (O'Connor joins majority in invalidating restriction of notary public status
to citizens; Rehnquist dissents); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (O'Connor would allow
in-state tuition discrimination against some aliens; Rehnquist would allow it against all
aliens).
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through the electoral process. In Brown v. Thomson,2 2 4 the Court
upheld Wyoming's apportionment scheme for its house of representatives despite a maximum deviation of eighty-nine percent
from population equality between counties. Justice Powell's opinion relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiffs were challenging
only the representation granted to the state's least populous
county. Under the apportionment formula provided by the Wyoming legislature, Niobrara County would not have been entitled to
any representation in the Wyoming house. The legislative scheme,
however, guaranteed each county at least one representative.
Plaintiffs challenged Niobrara County's mathematically undeserved single representative on the ground that it diluted the votes
of residents of more populous counties. O'Connor, Rehnquist, Burger, and Stevens joined Powell's opinion while Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
In Karcher V. Daggett,22 5 decided the same day, the Court invalidated a New Jersey congressional apportionment scheme with a
maximum deviation of 0.6984%. Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that the state failed to meet its burden of showing that
"the population deviations in its plan were necessary to achieve
some legitimate state objective. '226 O'Connor again joined the majority, along with Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; Burger,
White, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented. Thus, Rehnquist, Burger,
and Powell would have upheld imperfect apportionment schemes
in both cases and Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun would have
invalidated both plans. The discrepancy in White's voting pattern
apparently rested on the size of the numerical deviation, and Stevens explained his vote in Karcher as a vote against deliberate political gerrymandering. 22 7 What seems irreconcilable at first glance
is O'Connor's approval of the large deviation in Brown and her
condemnation of the small deviation in Karcher.
O'Connor explained her apparently inconsistent votes in a concurrence in Brown.22 8 After an initial bow both to equality as a
guiding ideal and to a need for flexibility, she relied on two aspects
224 462

U.S. 835 (1983).
U.S. 725 (1983).
216Id. at 740.
217 Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring).
228 462 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Stevens joined her concurrence in Brown,
235 462

although she did not join his in Karcher.
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of the Wyoming scheme to justify treating it more favorably than
the New Jersey scheme. First, while New Jersey failed to demonstrate that its deviations were necessary to any non-discriminatory
purpose, O'Connor had "no doubt that the population deviation
resulting from the provision of one representative to Niobrara
County is the product of the consistent and nondiscriminatory application of Wyoming's longstanding policy of preserving county
boundaries. '229 Second, emphasizing that even this policy would
not justify a statewide maximum deviation of eighty-nine percent,3 ° O'Connor noted that the relevant deviation in the case was
not the eighty-nine percent "when the State of Wyoming is viewed
as a whole, but the additional deviation from equality produced by
231
the allocation of one representative to Niobrara County.
Both votes are consistent with classical republican ideals. In
Karcher, O'Connor voted to uphold the principle of "one person,
one vote," thus preserving to each citizen an undiluted voice in the
electoral process. In Brown, however, that republican principle collided with another classical ideal. O'Connor's reliance on the importance of preserving county boundaries, a justification rejected
by the liberal dissenters, 232 echoes a theme discussed in the next
section: the notion of the community itself as an independent entity with interests to be protected. O'Connor was willing to protect
individuals' access to community membership and participation
only to the point at which it conflicted with ensuring the viability
of a certain type of community. The priority of the community's
interests, at the cost of diminishing the value of membership for
some of its members, recalls the republican demand that individuals subordinate their selfish desires to the needs of the collective.
O'Connor's emphasis on the fact that the additional deviation in
this case was quite small suggests both a limit to the sacrifices that
communities may demand of their members and a feminine tendency to examine apportionment questions in context rather than
in the abstract.2 3
Another case involving neither race nor gender discrimination
229

230
231
222
23

Id. at 849.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 849
See id. at 853-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 188-201 and accompanying text; infra notes 269-306 and accompany-

ing text.
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helps to elucidate the boundaries of O'Connor's view of the relationship between community values and discrimination. In United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott,23 4 union members

assaulted and severely injured nonunion employees. The victims
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging a conspiracy to violate
their civil rights. White's majority opinion held that the plaintiffs
stated no cause of action. The claim of conspiracy to violate the
victim's first amendment rights of association with other nonunion employees failed because it involved neither state action nor
an attempt to influence state action. The majority then relied upon
established precedent to hold that a section 1985(3) claim of conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws does
not require state action, but does require a class-based animus.
The majority concluded that a bias against others because of their
economic views or status did not constitute the requisite "classbased animus."
Unsurprisingly, the decision evoked an angry dissent from the
liberals. Blackmun authored the dissent, which was joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Blackmun prefaced his lengthy
and thorough historical examination of the legislative intent in enacting section 1985(3) with a telling description of how the problem ought to be framed:
The Ku Klux Klan Act was the Reconstruction Congress' response
to politically motivated mob violence in the postbellum South
designed to intimidate persons in the exercise of their legal rights.
...

Today, in a classic case of mob violence intended to intimidate

persons from exercising their legal rights, the
Court holds that the
23 5
Ku Klux Klan Act provides no protection.

This characterization of the issue helps explain why an otherwise
politically conservative Justice O'Connor might join the dissent.
Mob violence aimed at intimidating persons from exercising legal
rights-whether against blacks in the postbellum South or against
the non-union employees in Scott-is a time-tested method of
keeping outsiders on the outside. The majority's division of classbased animus into biases based on race, on political status, and on
economic status, each subject to different rules under section
1- 463 U.S. 824 (1983).
2

Id. at 839-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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1985(3), overlooks the fundamental similarity of all instances of
mob violence inspired by a desire to keep members of another class
from sharing in the benefits adhering to membership in the conspirators' own group.
A final case, Zobel v. Williams,3 6 serves to highlight the unique
status of the feminine perspective in modern jurisprudence. That
case involved a challenge to an Alaska statute that distributed a
state budget surplus to state residents in varying amounts depending on their length of residency. Burger, in an opinion joinedby all
the justices except Rehnquist and O'Connor, found the scheme invalid under the equal protection clause. Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, would have upheld the statute. O'Connor concurred in the
judgment only: she found the statute valid under the equal protection clause but invalid as a violation of the right to travel protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
Alaska attempted to justify its distribution scheme as a way to
reward residents for their past contributions to the state. Using
only a rational basis test to strike down the statute, the majority
found this objective illegitimate. O'Connor disagreed:
I respectfully suggest ... that the Court misdirects its criticism
when it labels Alaska's objective illegitimate. A desire to compensate citizens for their prior contributions is neither inherently invidious nor irrational. Under some circumstances, the objective
may be wholly reasonable. Even a generalized desire to reward citizens for past endurance, particularly in a State where years of
hardship only recently have produced prosperity, is not innately
improper. 237
In a footnote, she suggested community volunteer work and contributions to the state's ecology as examples of the types of benefits
to the community that it might be rational to reward. 23 8 Reiterating the legitimacy of rewarding past service to the community,
O'Connor stated that she "would recognize them as valid goals and
inquire only whether their implementation infringed any constitutionally protected interest. ' 23 9 She ultimately found such an infringement of the right to travel and therefore joined the majority
457 U.S. 55 (1982).
at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
21 Id. at 72 n.1.
236

137 Id.

239 Id.
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in holding the statute invalid.
O'Connor's opinion in Zobel is illuminating in a number of respects. Her refusal to find an equal protection violation in a case
not involving a "discrete and insular minority"-a group with outsider status-is consistent with the feminine jurisprudential rejection of individual rights except where they implicate community
membership. Her reliance on the right to travel suggests protection
of the right to join a community: she notes that "[s]tripped to its
essentials, the plan denie[d] non-Alaskans settling in the state the
same privileges afforded longer term residents.

' 240

Most important,

O'Connor, unlike most of the Court, is willing to allow communities to discriminate among members on the basis of their past willingness to suppress their own selfish desires for the benefit of the
community. A republican community may-indeed must-reward
individual virtue. An egalitarian community of autonomous indi24 1
viduals'may not.

3. A Community Perspective
A communitarian feminine jurisprudence is manifested in a variety of other O'Connor opinions. In several cases, she seems to treat
the community as a discrete and important juridical entity. In Allen v. Wright, 42 parents of black public schoolchildren sought
standing to challenge IRS procedures that were allegedly ineffective in preventing discriminatory private schools from illegally obtaining tax exempt status. The plaintiffs alleged that the availability of tax-exempt status for discriminatory private schools made it
more difficult to integrate the public schools their children attended. O'Connor's majority opinion rejected this argument and
several others, and found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. In attempting to base their standing to sue on the effect of the tax exemptions on public schools, the plaintiffs relied heavily on Coit v.
Green.43 In Coit, the district court allowed parents of black public
school students to challenge the IRS grant of tax exemptions to
Id. at 73.
'41Contrast O'Connor with Baker's description of Rawlsian liberalism: "people in the
240

original position, not knowing if they themselves would be virtuous, would not choose rules
that aim at rewarding virtue." Baker, supra note 112, at 913.
242 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
243 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (mem.).
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racially discriminatory private schools. 244 The Supreme Court affirmed summarily. In Allen, O'Connor sought to distinguish Coit
by focusing in part on the size of the affected community: she
noted that "the suit in Coit was limited to the public schools of
one State," 245 in contrast to the Allen complaint, "which aims at
nationwide relief. '246 As Brennan pointed out in dissent, the size of
the community is irrelevant to standing but instead "relates solely
to the scope of a properly certified class. '247 O'Connor's use of the
distinction is therefore novel. It perhaps suggests an underlying
perception that small, homogenous, cohesive communities are the
appropriate targets of judicial relief.
Communities are not only independent juridical entities, but, in
Justice O'Connor's view, they are often entitled to more favorable
treatment than individuals. In Block v. North Dakota,4 8 O'Connor
was the sole dissenter from the Court's application of a general
statute of limitations to bar a state's suit to quiet title. Her opinion
stressed that the state should not be subject to the statute of limitations applicable to ordinary individuals because the state holds
land "in trust for the public. ' 24 9 In Idaho v. Oregon,2 50 she would
have held ordinary rules limiting equitable remedies similarly inapplicable to a state's suit to protect its fishing rights.2 5 1 Finally, in
Jefferson County PhamaceuticalAssociation v. Abbott Laboratories,2 52 she would have held the sale of phamaceutical products to
state and local government-operated hospitals (for resale in competition with private pharmacies) exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act. 253 She seemed again to rely on a notion that government
institutions are unique because of their status vis-a-vis their citizens: she found the exemption appropriate because "[s]tate and local governments have developed programs for providing services to

244 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
245Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3332.
246 Id. at 3333.
247 Id. at 3340 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
219 Id. at 295 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
250 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
251
252

252

See id. at 1032-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
460 U.S. 150 (1983).
See id. at 189 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the public .

.

. based on the .

.

. assumption [that they are

exempt] .,,254
O'Connor is particularly unlikely to take a typical conservative
approach-and thus particularly likely to disagree with Rehnquist-in cases implicating participation in the processes of government. On issues as diverse as restrictions on the broadcast media,25 5 exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act,2 58
interpretation of the Voting Rights Act,257 and rewards to citizens
for community service, 5 8 she has disagreed with Rehnquist (and
often with the liberals as well) on the explicit or implicit ground
that his position undermines the right or duty of citizens to participate in government. Inexplicable under ordinary conservative
political theory, her position may reflect both an emphasis on
membership in the community and a view that shaping the values
of the community through governmental processes is one important function of community members.
O'Connor also is more likely to find and stress the "public purpose" of various governmental actions. In Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe,2 5 9 she agreed with a liberal majority that the Indian
tribe's taxing power derived from the tribe's general power to
"control economic activities within its jurisdiction, and to defray
the cost of providing governmental services; ' 260 she rejected the
conservative dissent's argument that it derived merely from the
power to exclude non-Indians from reservation lands."'1 In a contracts clause case, Energy Reserves Corp. v. Kansas Power & Light
Co.,2 62 she joined a portion of a liberal majority opinion rejected by
the conservative concurrences; the controversial section concluded
that even if there had been an impairment of contract, there was a
sufficient public purpose to uphold the governmental action.26 3 She
also wrote a unanimous opinion in a takings case, Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,264 that can only be explained from a commuId. at 188 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).
156 See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982).
111See cases cited supra note 223.
258 See Zobel v. WiUiams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
259 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
2,o Id. at 137.
"I See id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155

262

459 U.S. 400 (1983).

"S See id. at 416-17.
2-

104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). For further discussion of this aspect of this case, see Sherry,
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nitarian perspective, essentially approving land redistribution for
its own sake.
Finally, describing O'Connor as a communitarian is as explanatory as the "conservative" label when it comes to her obvious hostility to the rights of criminal defendants. Not only does she constitute part of the core conservative majority in most criminal
procedure cases, she occasionally construes the fourth and fifth
amendments even more narrowly than some of her conservative
brethren. In Segura v. United States,6 5 she was the only justice to
join Burger's characterization of the fourth amendment as primarily precluding unreasonable, rather than warrantless, seizures. In
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy,2e6 only she and Stevens dissented from a
holding that an individual could not be required to testify as to the
content of his own grand jury testimony at a civil deposition without further grant of immunity. In Colorado v. Nunez,6 7 a case in
which certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted, she
joined White's concurring opinion reaching the merits of the fourth
amendment question and construing that amendment to afford
very narrow protection. 6 8 If the community is more important
than individual rights, it is quite predictable that Justice O'Connor
would be a strong law and order proponent: she will protect the
community from crime even at the expense of the individual rights
of criminal defendants.
B.

Virtue in Context

The emerging jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor also exhibits a
characteristically feminine perspective in its emphasis on contex-

Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 Minn. L.
Rev. 611 (1986).
266 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984).
-66459 U.S. 248 (1983).
267 465 U.S 324 (1984).
218See id. at 326-27; see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (O'Connor concurs
in part and dissents in part; agrees that nontestimonial evidence derived from informal interrogation is admissable and states that she would agree with the Court's public safety
exception to Miranda rule for oral statements if the Court were writing on a clean slate);
Anderson v. Fuller, 455 U.S. 1028 (1982) (joining Burger dissent from denial of certiorari
where court of appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence of intention in a felony-murder conviction). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (O'Connor joins
majority holding that a warrantless nighttime entry into defendant's home to arrest him for
a non-jailable civil traffic offense violated the fourth amendment).
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tual decisionmaking and its focus on the virtues of the decisionmaker rather than the rights of those about whom decisions
are made. These two notions seem intertwined in the legal context
insofar as the rejection of rigid, bright-line rules often undermines
the protection of individual rights and thus leaves a gap in the theory of decisionmaking. The feminine focus on the virtue of connection-which, at least in the criminal context, often translates as
compassion or mercy-fills that gap.
O'Connor often rejects bright-line rules and occasionally makes
explicit her preference for contextual determinations. Wilson v.
Garcia269 involved the question of the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Established doctrine
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs courts to look to state law for the
appropriate limitations period, and courts accordingly have applied
the limitations period applicable to the state cause of action most
closely analogous to the section 1983 claim. This led courts to apply varying limitation periods to claims under section 1983, depending on the characterization of plaintiff's particular claim.270

With O'Connor as the sole dissenter, the Court in Wilson decided
that all section 1983 actions should be characterized as personal
injury actions for purposes of determining the appropriate statute
of limitation. Stevens' majority opinion rested primarily on a need
for a uniform rule. O'Connor argued instead for the application of
"individualized statutues of limitation. 2

71

She noted that the di-

versity of claims under section 1983, "'ranging from simple police
brutality to school desegregation cases,' ,,272 made the Court's "single inflexible analogy" inappropriate. 73 She pejoratively characterized the majority's demand for uniformity as a mere "'desire for
symmetry of abstract legal principles.' ",274 Finally, she pointed out
the new rule would not ensure uniformity: "The Court's new analogy lacks any magical power to conjure uniformity where diversity
149 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).

See id. at 1946 & nn.32-33 (recognizing problem and citing cases).
I'l Id. at 1950 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 1951 (quoting Note, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494,
270

504 (1970)).
273 Id.
'7,Id. at 1953 (quoting Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797,
813 (1957)).
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'275
is the natural order.
O'Connor's strong dislike of bright-line rules is particularly evident in a labor case, Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service v.
NLRB. 27' The sole issue in the case was whether a bargaining impasse justified an employer's withdrawal from a multiemployer
bargaining unit. The majority adopted a uniform rule prohibiting
withdrawal under those circumstances, and Burger's dissent (in
which Rehnquist joined) advocated a uniform rule permitting
withdrawal. O'Connor dissented separately to argue that the answer should depend on an examination of "the circumstances surrounding and following an impasse. '27 7 Similarly, in United States
v. Mechanik,2 7 s Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion adopted a per
se rule that subsequent conviction by a petit jury makes certain
constitutional violations in the grand jury harmless error.
O'Connor's concurrence rejected both the majority's rule and the
presumption of the existence of prejudice from grand jury violations. She instead would direct courts to examine, in each case,
whether "the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt as to whether it had such
effect." 219 Thus, even where she agrees with Rehnquist's result,
she will sometimes file a separate opinion to record that the basis
for her decision is the particular circumstances of the case.28 0 She

215 Id.; see Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (O'Connor joins majority in applying
local rule, not uniform federal rule, pertaining to effect of denial of class certification on
statute of limitations); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)
(O'Connor dissents from application of uniform federal statute of limitations to an employee's combined suit against employer for breach of collective bargaining agreement and
against union for breach of its duty of fair representation). O'Connor frequently disagrees
with Rehnquist on statute of limitations issues, although not always in any particular pattern. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985) (Rehnquist
joins Steven's dissent; O'Connor does not); Honda Motor Co. v. Coons, 105 S.Ct. 808 (1985)
(Rehnquist dissents from denial of certiorari; O'Connor does not); Simmons v. Sea-Land
Serv. Inc., 459 U.S. 931 (1982) (White and O'Connor dissent from denial of certiorari; Rehnquist does not).
278 454 U.S. 404 (1982).
277 Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 (1983)

(Rehnquist writes majority opinion affirming NLRB refusal to award "complete relief" for
violations of NLRB prohibition against "hot cargo" agreements; O'Connor alone dissents

and would require NLRB to determine whether requested relief was necessary under the
circumstances to effectuate the prohibition).
278

54 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986).

27, Id.
280

at 4170.
See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 105 S.Ct. 687 (1985); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1
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also often writes separately to note that the Court's decision does
not foreclose individual determinations to the contrary on remand
or under other circumstances."'
O'Connor further elaborated her requirement of individualized
decisionmaking in a criminal case that saw her aligned with the
liberal majority against the conservative contingent. In Eddings v.
Oklahoma,28 2 she joined the majority holding that the eighth
amendment requires an individualized consideration of mitigating
circumstances in capital cases. The Court thus invalidated a state
law that, as interpreted by the state courts, precluded the consideration of family background and personal history. The Chief Justice dissented, joined by White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun.
O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence to explain the need for
"extraordinary measures to ensure . . that the sentence was not
imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake. ' 28 3 Those
safeguards, in effect, ensure that the punishment is tailored to individual desert.
Individualized decisionmaking does not always lead O'Connor to
a decision in favor of the individual. In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,2 84 she dissented (with Powell and Rehnquist) from
the majority's finding that failure to observe a uniform requirement of notice by mail before property could be sold for taxes constituted a violation of due process. While the majority invalidated
the sale because it failed to conform to the applicable rule,
O'Connor would have held the notice sufficient under the particular circumstances of the case.
O'Connor's requirement of contextual decisionmaking apparently applies not only to the end result of a case but also to the
Supreme Court's consideration of the applicable legal test.
2 85
Bearden v. Georgia,
raised the question whether a court could
(1982).
' See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985);
United States v. Locke, 105 S. Ct. 1785 (1985); Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Smith v. Phillips, 455
U.S. 209 (1982).
'8
455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Id. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
' 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
285 461 U.S. 660 (1983). O'Connor's invalidation of the automatic revocation of probation
is also an example of her compassionate view of punishment in general. See infra notes 295301 and accompanying text.
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revoke the probation of an indigent who failed to pay a fine and
restitution. O'Connor's majority opinion held that where the probationer fails to pay through no fault of his own, a court must first
determine whether there are any alternatives to imprisonment
before revoking probation. Earlier cases involving imprisonment of
indigent defendants had rested exclusively on equal protection
grounds, 288 and the parties in Bearden consequently focused on
whether strict scrutiny or rational basis was the appropriate standard of review.2 87 O'Connor rejected this formulaic approach and
decided the legal issue itself by reference to the circumstances:
Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the
issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole
analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as
"the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which
it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative
means and purpose, [and] 8the existence of alternative means for
'28
effectuating the purpose.
O'Connor thus seems to reject the rigid, abstract decisionmaking
process that characterizes modern equal protection law.
One prerequisite for individualized decisionnaking is a modicum
of procedural protections to ensure accurate assessment of individual circumstances. Thus, although O'Connor is unwilling to enforce
the rights of criminal defendants where those rights are peripheral
to the truthf'mding function of the criminal justice system,"' she
jealously guards other sorts of procedural protections. She has
joined majority opinions, over Rehnquist dissents, in cases holding
that indigent defendants are guaranteed effective assistance of
counsel on first appeal,290 that a state must provide an indigent
defendant with a psychiatric expert if the defendant makes a preliminary showing that sanity is likely to be a significant factor at
trial,29 1 and that technical procedural rules cannot bar a defendant
from obtaining the protection of an instruction that cautions the
jury not to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure
211

See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).

187Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665.
288Id. at 666-67 (footnote omitted)

(quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
281 See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
290 See Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S.Ct. 830 (1985).
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985).
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to testify.292 Full consideration of factual and legal circumstances
is conducive to individualized decisionmaking, and O'Connor
therefore is generally hostile to procedural "technicalities,"
whether they preclude consideration of issues favorable to the
state or the criminal defendant.2 93 Outside the criminal context,
she again favors greater procedural protections than the conserva294
tive label would predict.
Another general exception to O'Connor's adoption of the conservative, law-and-order position is the area of punishment in general and capital punishment in particular. An examination of her
opinions in this area suggest three characteristically feminine aspects. First, punishment decisions are a quintessential example of
her call for individualized decisionmaking, leading her to eschew
hard and fast rules condemning individuals to death." 5 Second, leniency toward convicted criminals suggests that she may allow the
virtue of mercy or compassion to alter the formal rules of the criminal justice system.29 Third, she tends to focus on the responsibil"' See James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1984); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288
(1981) (establishing right to such instruction).
293 Compare New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that she might be willing to alter Miranda requirements) with Boag v. MacDougal, 454 U.S. 364 (1982) (joining majority that liberally construes an indigent prisoner's pro
se complaint and therefore reverses its dismissal).
2" See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); Gregory v.
Town of Pittsfield, 105 S. Ct. 1380 (1985) (O'Connor dissenting from denial of certiorari).
2, See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 827-31 (1983) (O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, dissents from majority opinion invalidating death penalty in felony-murder conviction
for lack of intent, but agrees that case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing
because court failed to consider individual mitigating circumstances); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (O'Conner concurs to emphasize need for individualized consideration
of mitigating circumstances).
'" See, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) (O'Connor's majority opinion held
that sentencing procedure in a capital case is equivalent to trial on the merits of imposing
the death penalty, and the double jepoardy clause prohibits death sentence on remand after
life sentence was set aside); Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201 (1981) (O'Connor joins
Steven's dissent from majority holding that a juvenile sentence could be converted into an
adult sentence, which would result in more severe confinement conditions); see also Brown
v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 601 (1984) (Burger, White, and Rehnqulst, but not O'Connor, dissent
from denial of certiorari where lower court had vacated death sentence). O'Connor also declined to join Rehnquist's dissent in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), discussed infra. Although she did not comment on specific portions of his opinion, and it is
therefore impossible to describe exactly her views on compassion and mercy, it is at least
plausible to suggest that she would not subscribe to the following (paradigmatically male)
comment in Rebnquist's opinion:
Despite the Court's rhetorical references to the need for "reliable" sentencing deci-
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ity and virtue of the decisionmaker rather than on the rights of the
27
defendant.
298
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Caldwell v. Mississippi il-

luminates her focus on the responsibility of the decisionmaker
rather than the rights of the defendant. Caldwell was a challenge
to a death sentence imposed after the prosecutor told the jury:
[Y]our decision [to impose the death sentence] is not the final decision ... Your job is reviewable ... [Defense counsel is] insinuating that your decision is the final decision and they're gonna take
Bobby Caldwell out in front of this Courthouse in moments and
string him up and that is terribly, terribly unfair. For they know,
as I know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the decision you
make is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court.
Automatically[.] 99
Marshall's majority opinion vacating the sentence focused on the
likelihood that such an instruction would create unreliability and
bias against the defendant. In a typically male or modern or liberal
characterization of the constitutional flaw in the prosecutor's statement, Marshall concluded that:
The "delegation" of sentencing responsibility that the prosecutor
here encouraged would thus not simply postpone the defendant's
right to a fair determinationof the appropriatenessof his death;
rather it would deprive him of that right, for an appellate court,
unlike a capital sentencing jury, is wholly ill-suited to evaluate the
appropriateness of death in the first instance. 00
O'Connor joined most of the majority opinion and concurred in
the result, but she wrote separately primarily to clarify that she
did not interprete California v. Ramos"'1 to preclude giving accusions rendered by jurors that comprehend their "awesome responsibility," I do not
understand the Court to believe that emotions in favor of mercy must play a part in
the ultimate decision of a capital sentencing jury. Indeed, much of our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has been concerned with eliminating emotion from sentencing decisions.
Id. at 2650.
297 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (discussed infra notes 298-302
and accompanying text).
298 Id.
290 Id. at 2637-38.
200

Id. at 2640 (emphasis added).

201

463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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rate and non-misleading information about appellate review to a
sentencing jury. The flavor of her opinion, however, is entirely different from that of Marshall's. Where Marshall rests on the statement's detrimental effect on the defendant, O'Connor's brief opinion instead emphasizes the detrimental effect on the jury's sense of
its own awesome responsibility:
In my view, the prosecutor's remarks were impermissible because
they were inaccurate and misleading in a manner that diminished
the jury's sense of responsibility.
In telling the jurors, "your decision is not the final decision ...
[y]our job is reviewable," the prosecutor sought to minimize the
sentencing jury's role ....
Although the subsequent remarks of the prosecutor to which Justice Rehnquist refers in his dissent. . may have helped to restore
the jurors' sense of the importance of their role, I agree with the
Court that they failed to correct the impression that the appellate
court would be free to reverse the death sentence if it disagreed
with the jury's conclusion that death was appropriate.302
This analysis seems to focus on the jury's action for its own sake,
rather than simply because of its likely effect on the defendant.
Responsible decisionmaking may be a virtue in and of itself, regardless of its probable consequences. Moreover, responsible decisionmaking is a relational virtue in that it reflects the jury's relationship to the defendant: the jury is in a position to be merciful,
just, and compassionate toward him, and not simply in a position
to enforce (or refrain from violating) his rights. A view of the sentencing decision as implicating the jury's duty to act in a just manner is paradigmatically feminine.
This contrast between rights and obligations, between rule-based
demands and aspirational virtues, is also apparent in the ways that
O'Connor and Rehnquist view the special role of lawyers in our
society. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,30 3
O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist and Burger, dissented from the
majority holding that a state cannot bar nonmisleading but unsolicited legal advice. In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v.

302
303

105 S. Ct. at 2646-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
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30 4
Piper,
however, O'Connor joined a majority holding that, over a
Rehnquist dissent, invalidated residency requirements for membership in the bar. Thus, each would have allowed the state to create special rules for lawyers-not applicable to the general public-in at least some contexts. The two cases considered together
contrast O'Connor's view of lawyers as special in virtue of their
greater responsibility with Rehnquist's view of lawyers as special in
view of the nature of their craft.
In Zauderer, O'Connor found free, unsolicited legal advice qualitatively different from the advertisements or free products of other
business, and consequently more regulable. She based this conclusion on the greater obligations of lawyers toward society:

In my view, state regulation of professional advice in advertisements is qualitatively different from regulation of claims concerning commercial goods and merchandise, and is entitled to greater
deference than the majority's analysis would permit. .

.

. The

States understandably require more of attorneys than of others engaged in commerce. Lawyers are professionals, and as such they
have greater obligations. As Justice Frankfurter once observed,
"[f]rom a profession charged with [constitutional] responsibilities,
there must be exacted .

.

. qualities of truth-speaking, of a high

sense of honor, of granite discretion." The legal profession has in
the past been distinguished and well served by a code of ethics
which imposes certain standards beyond those prevailing in the
marketplace and by a duty to place professional responsibility
above pecuniary gain.3°5
This passage provides a stark contrast to Rehnquist's Piper dissent, in which he explicitly refused to subscribe to a virtue-based
theory of the difference between lawyers and others:
My belief that the practice of law differs from other trades and
businesses for Art. IV, § 2 purposes is not based on some notion
that law is for some reason a superior profession. The reason that
the practice of law should be treated differently is that law is one
occupation that does not readily translate across state lines. Certain aspects of legal practice are distinctly and intentionally nonnational30 8
105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
305 Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2295-96 (citations omitted).
30 Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1282-83 (footnote omitted).
3-
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In several contexts, then, O'Connor seems more willing to integrate
rights and responsibilities and to command that people act not
only fairly but also virtuously.
CONCLUSION:

A

SECOND LOOK AT COMMUNITY AND CONTEXT

In light of the revolutionary effect women's personality differences might have on jurisprudence, it is unsurprising to find that
Justice O'Connor approaches legal issues from a different perspective than that of her male colleagues. Her voting record, however,
puts her squarely in the conservative camp on most issues. This
nexus between a feminine voice and a conservative voice may seem
troubling to many. As an intellectual exercise, perhaps, it is useful
to isolate the feminine influence, but it does not seem to change
results. The current trend on the Court, with O'Connor's enthusiastic participation, is away from the liberal results of the Warren
Court. In particular, the Court seems to be adopting an approach
of "aggressive majoritarianism," fostering community and consensus at the expense of individual rights. 0 7 Had Justice Stewart been
replaced by a male ideological soulmate of Justice Rehnquist, a
similar result likely would have been achieved. The contexts in
which O'Connor reaches a less politically conservative result than
Rehnquist are few and well-defined; her impact is noticeable, but
not notable. So why does it matter that she draws her jurisprudence from her femininity rather than her politics?
There are three significant differences. First, regardless of the
content of a feminine perspective, recognition of its existence and
its different voice might itself change the outcome of some cases.
Where political or intellectual diversity is a legal issue, whether
one treats men and women as fundamentally similar or fundamentally different may have a significant effect. Two recent examples
are Roberts v. United States Jaycees 8 s and Steele v. FCC.3° In
Roberts, the Court held that the first amendment did not protect
the Jaycees' policy of excluding women from full membership. The
appellate court had sustained the Jaycees' argument that admission of women would infringe the organization's first amendment
30I See Sherry, supra note 264; Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritarian-

ism: A Court in Transition, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 15 (1984).
309 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
300 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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rights by changing the content of the group's message. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this argument on the ground that
it rested "solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative
interests and perspectives of men and women. 3 10 Similarly, in
Steele, the FCC sought to support its policy of preferentially
granting broadcast licenses to women on the ground that female
ownership and management would increase programming diversity.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected that
argument, again explicitly rejecting any notion of a feminine
perspective:
[I]t simply is not reasonable to expect that granting preferences to
women will increase programming diversity. Women transcend ethnic, religious, and other cultural barriers. In their social and political opinions and beliefs, for example, women in fact appear to be
just as divided among themselves as are men. Therefore it is not
reasonable to expect that a women would manifest a distinctly "female" editorial viewpoint.3 11
Thus, recognition of a feminine perspective- regardless of its content-might alter the decisions of male judges.
Second, an even more significant difference lies in the potential
for development of a feminine jurisprudence. The Court's move toward aggressive majoritarianism is only one translation of a communita rian philosophy or a perspective of connection. If, as Unger
has suggested, liberalism corrupts consensus (thus undermining
community), 12 one response is to reconstruct the authority of consensus by fiat. Enforced homogeneity, however, although it may
inject consensus and community into the jurisprudential paradigm,
is not the only-nor the most sophisticated-conception of community.3 13 It represents what Claire Dalton has called a "cor-

310 Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3255. O'Connor concurred only in the judgment, suggesting that
even if admission of women would change the content of the organization's message, she
would find the conduct unprotected as primarily commercial association. She was thus unwilling to accept the majority's blithe assumption that admission of women would have no
effect on the content of the Jaycees' expression. See id. at 3257-58.
311 Steele, 770 F.2d at 1199. Judge Patricia Wald dissented, finding the FCC hypothesis
of diversity reasonable. This suggests that women are more likely to accept the idea of a
feminine perspective.
312 R. Unger, Law In Modem Society 169 (1976).
313 See R. Dworkin, supra note 94, at 134-37.
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rupting form" of community, stressing
a community of sameness
3 14
rather than a community of diversity.
Feminine jurisprudence is in its infancy, both in terms of application by judges and its elaboration by scholars and teachers. Like
all moral, legal, and political theories, it needs time to develop. As
Michael Perry has noted, the American legal self-image, like the
American religious self-image, is one of evolution:
Our religious self-understanding has generally involved a commitment-though not necessarily a fully conscious commitment-to
the notion of moral evolution, because in the main we have avoided
the pretense that our current understanding of the moral universe
• . . was perfect and complete. Rather, we know that we are fallible
and that we must struggle incessantly to achieve a better-a
broader and deeper understanding. We also know that we are frail
and that our frailty necessitates an ongoing struggle to bring our
collective (political) practice into ever closer harmony with our
315
evolving, deepening moral understanding.
The moral and jurisprudential theories sketched out in this article
have not had the time, or the give and take of serious scholarship,
to develop. This article is itself only a very tentative first step:
once the paradigm has been exposed, the hard work of constructing a feminine jurisprudence (and refining its content through
evolution) lies ahead.
Finally, recognition of Justice O'Connor's unique perspective,
and the unique perspective of women in general, might aid us in
ameliorating the distortions of an overly individualist liberal paradigm. Insufficient attention to connection promotes naked self-interest at the expense of altruism, impoverishes our self-perception,
and stunts our capacity for growth. Merely communicating a feminine emphasis on connection may be enlightening: "Teaching is
not always a matter of either arguing or providing evidence.. . . It
314 C. Dalton, Remarks on Personhood 7 (Jan. 5, 1985) (paper presented at meeting of
Jurisprudence Section, AALS 1985 Annual Meeting).
315 M. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights 99 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See also B. Pascal, Thoughts on Religion and Philosophy 243 (. Taylor trans. 1894)
("Those whom we term the Ancients, were in fact novices in everything, and formed, properly speaking, the infancy of Humanity; and, as we have added to their knowledge the experience of succeeding ages, it is in ourselves we must find that antiquity we so reverence in
others.").
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is sometimes rather a matter of imparting a way of looking at
' ' 16
things.

316 Eldridge, On Knowing How to Live: Coleridge's "Frost At Midnight," 7 Philos. & Lit.
213, 227 (1983).
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